Naval War College Review

Volume 6
Number 7 *September*

Article 1

1953

September 1953 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Vol. VI No. 1 September, 1953

CONTENTS

SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

This is a special unclassified edition of the Naval War College Review.

Under no circumstances will material contained herein be republished nor quoted publicly without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.

Distribution of this issue is authorized to make available to recipients some of the benefits accruing to participants in the Global Strategy Discussions at the Naval War College. It will be kept in the possession of those receiving it and destroyed by burning when no longer required.

As a reader of the articles herein you share the same privilege as the attending audience in receiving the speakers' frank remarks and personal opinions. You also share the same responsibility of respecting the privacy of the speakers' expressions. Lectures at the Naval War College have always been of great benefit and interest because speakers have been willing to talk frankly, with knowledge of protection, thus contributing their most objective thinking without having to consider the possible viewpoints and reactions of an unknown audience.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

REPORT OF FIFTH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

The Fifth Annual Session of the Naval War College Global Strategy Discussions is reviewed in this edition.

The Discussions, a forum series in which facts and factors are investigated to assist those attending, individually, to become aware of problems which may face the United States in time of national emergency, were conducted May 4-8, 1953, inclusive.

The Naval War College inherently is vested with the prerogative of inquiring into the forces and principles controlling such an emergency or war; and determining from a Naval standpoint the conditions, limitations and other pertinent factors governing the successful solution to, or termination of, the conflict. Only through the exercise of such prerogative can it further an understanding, among its students, of the fundamentals of warfare and their application to future naval warfare.

Believing that the solution of many of today's problems are to be found only through the interchange of objective opinions, candidly spoken, the Naval War College, through the annual session of Global Strategy Discussions, has furnished a vehicle for such expressions. Subject matter in the Discussions range from basic factors influencing the world situation to specific opinions on national and military strategy.

The fact that over 60 eminent civilians, highly respected leaders in their own fields, attended the 1953 Session at their own expense was indicative of the prestige won through the four previous Discussions. All joined freely in the interchange of thought-provoking ideas. To their contribution were added those of some 87 Senior Naval Reserve Officers, many quite prominent in their civilian professions. Adding another facet to the program was the

attendance of representatives of other service schools and various military organizations. In this group, there were 11 of flag rank. Including the students and staff of the Naval War College, there were over 500 present. Attention is invited to the list of participants published elsewhere in this edition.

Indicative, also, of the success of the program was the fact that a large percentage of those attending expressed an enthusiastic desire to attend next year. This fact is gratifying to the Naval War College, which is highly appreciative of the assistance given by the lecturers and by the participants to help it carry out its mission.

The schedule and agenda is published herein as a matter of interest to the officers of the Service. In addition, lectures which featured the Global Strategy Discussions are reproduced for the reader's benefit.

The Sixth Session of the Global Strategy Discussions is tentatively scheduled during the month of June, 1954.

SCHEDULE

4 May — Monday

0830 - 1030	Draw Global Strategy Discussions material in Library, Mahan Hall.
1045	Opening remarks by the President, Naval War College, in the auditorium, Pringle Hall
1055	Security Briefing
1100	Lecture—"Current World Situation"
1400	Group Sessions Subject—Examination of the World Situation

5 May — Tuesday

0830	Group Sessions Subject—The National Objectives of the United States
1330	Group Sessions Subject—Summary of the National Objectives
1500	Lecture—"Economic Factors in the Formulation of National Strategy" Dr. Charles F. Roos

6 May — Wednesday

0830	Group Sessions Subject—A Global Strategic Concept—Economic Considerations
1100	Lecture—"Political Factors in the Formulation of National Strategy" Dr. James P. Baxter
1400	Group Sessions Subject—A Global Strategic Concept—Political Considerations
1600 - 1700	Estimate of Armed Forces Naval War College Team

7 May — Thursday

0830	Lecture—"Strategic Services in Cold War" Major General William J. Donovan
1030	Group Sessions Subject—A Global Strategic Concept—Military Considerations

1330 — Group Sessions
Subject—Formulation of a Global Strategic Concept and Supporting Measures

8 May — Friday

0900 - 1230 — Plenary Session
Auditorium, Pringle Hall

THE GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSION

Purpose: To further an understanding by individual civilian and military participants of the situation faced by the United States and its Allies and of the courses of action that would deal with this situation.

Goals:

a. To examine critically the world situation.

b. To postulate a set of national objectives.

c. To formulate a global strategic concept and requisite supporting measures that would achieve our national objectives.

Scope:

a. Discussions will be aimed at the most fundamental factors only in order to take advantage of many diverse viewpoints and still achieve discussion goals in the limited time available.

b. In order to promote early progress, a sample reasonable set of national objectives will be furnished. This may be used as it is, or it may be modified or rejected. The "national objectives" finally accepted by a group are to be used as a means to an end and it is not intended that the discussions become absorbed in this phase of the proceedings.

c. The global strategic concepts should encompass measures necessary to deal with situations of (1) precarious peace, (2) quasi-war or limited wars and (3) all-out war resulting from the present world situation. It should provide for integrating military, economic, spiritual and political elements of strength of the United States.

Method:

a. Small groups, consisting of officers of the staff and regular and reserve classes of the Naval War College, civilian and military guests, will meet for discussion of the subject and formulation of group solutions. The moderator for each group will be a Naval War College officer student. It will be understood that no individual need identify himself with the final composite solution of his group.

b. The program will include selected reading and lectures in addition to group and plenary discussions. Pertinent classified material will be presented and library facilities will be made available for all visiting participants.

c. A plenary session will be held on the last day of the discussions to present features of special interest which have been developd in the groups.

Security

a. Privacy accorded individual utterances.

In accordance with the established policy of the Naval War College the utterances of speakers and discussion participants will be accorded scrupulous privacy. Any information subsequently used outside the Naval War College will not be associated with the originator. This protection accorded the

privacy of the individuals' utterances is expected to result, as it has in the past, in giving all participants the benefit of educated opinions frankly expressed by which means alone the purposes and goals of the discussions can be achieved.

b. U. S. Security information

Most lectures, materials, discussion utterances and results of the Global Strategy Discussions will be in the category of security information, which means that disclosure to an unauthorized individual or government would be potentially or actually adverse to the national security of the United States. Security measures will be announced on the opening day of the discussions.

The U. S. Naval War College Held Its Fifth Annual Series of Global Strategy Discussions at the College, Newport, R. I. 4-8 May 1953. Shown here are: l to r, Rear Admiral W. M. Beakley, U.S.N. Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral C. C. Wood, U.S.N., Major General W. J. Donovan, U.S.A. (Ret), Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, U.S.N., President, Naval War College, Admiral A. G. Kirk, U.S.N. (Ret), Vice Admiral F. G. Fahrion, U.S.N., and Rear Admiral R. L. Campbell, U.S.N.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND WELCOME

By The President

VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD L. CONOLLY, U. S. N.

To Participants in

The Naval War College

Fifth Annual Session

of the

GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

4 May 1953

Permit me to extend to you officially a warm welcome to the Naval War College and a cordial invitation to participate in the Fifth Annual Session of our Global Strategy Discussions.

I would like to give you some idea of the composition of the group which is assembled here for these discussions:

First, the staff of the Naval War College and the students of our several classes, which are as follows: The Strategy and Tactics Class, the Strategy and Logistics Class, the Command and Staff Class, and a small group of five officers who are pursuing an Advanced Course of Study here.

Secondly, a group of representatives from the various Service schools and military colleges.

Thirdly, a group of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve officers who have been selected for two weeks' active duty here at the War College from all of our Naval Districts.

Fourthly, a group of civilians who have been chosen from as many different phases of our national life as possible, each of whom is eminent in his own field and all of whom are highly respected, loyal and patriotic citizens of the United States. We are fortunate indeed to have these distinguishd men come here to help us.

With regard to security of the discussions, I request that you all respect our confidence, maintain inviolate the classification of papers and other information of a classified nature made available to you here and particularly that no statements of any participant be discussed outside nor attributed publicly to the author. Only by observing these restrictions can we hope to have free discussion in our meetings.

The four groups that I have mentioned will be more or less evenly distributed and integrated into our twenty-six seminar groups. The fourth category, the civilians, may perhaps feel themselves confronted with an overwhelming representation of what has become to be known as "the military mind." I would like to alleviate apprehension on this score, at least to some degree, by assuring them most seriously that here at the Naval War College, and in fact at every one of our higher Service educational institutions, a very earnest attempt is being made to broaden the military mind by contact in an increasing degree with civilian influences. These Global Strategy Discussions I would consider to be a notable example. In regard to the Reserve officer group, although they served with us for a period of years during the last war, they have all had an opportunity since being released from active duty with the Services to undergo an emancipation and a reclamation process, which might be called "demilitarization." Although they have been here already a week, I am confident that they have not been reinfected in that short time.

In previous years' "Discussions" we have confined ourselves solely to shaping a military strategy for an all-out global war. This was the end-product of our efforts. However this year we are including the strategy and the military policies necessary to meet the requirements of a long continuing state of "Cold War." We are also to consider that the term "Cold War" may include possibility of limited hostilities as in Korea and Indo-China and similar involvement elsewhere; also, quasi-war or a state of suspend-

ed hostilities as in the case of the Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa.

In undertaking a study of this kind, in order to arrive at a strategic concept that will outline realistic planned action and definite policies, we must progress from the general to the more specific and from the abstract to the concrete. We must progress from objectives to policies and, finally, evolve a strategic concept and a program for actual military readiness. I believe that you would do well to subject your final decisions, in arriving at this strategic concept and this program of readiness, to some such test of suitability, feasibliity and acceptability, as you can find outlined in our War College publication "Sound Military Decision."

In the winning of the "Cold War," we must employ most effectively novel, unorthodox and, to most, unfamiliar methods and types of operations. Some part of such a program has been highlighted in the press as "Psychological Warfare." In this sort of a campaign, we will act against the enemy by operations of several categories: political, economic, military, psychological and educational, and para-military. In later address, General Donovan will handle this subject.

In the next three years, we may justifiably foresee many far-reaching and significant changes in the political, economic, and strategic strength factors of the Western Allies. Most vital to this augmentation of total allied strength will be the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces and the total warmaking potential of the United States itself, for this is the base of the whole structure. Inclusion of West Germany into a European Army would result in tremendous accretion of strength.

During this period, our program of economic and military aid to the NATO nations—particularly in Continental Europe—will, if it is successful as we expect, have achieved a tremendous build-up of the capability to resist invasion from the east. The

ground and air forces of NATO on the Continent will probably always require an increment of United States strength, together with a continued flow of material support to stiffen and nourish them. Nevertheless, as the combined strength of the Western European Armies grows, our commitment to them will be lessened. In determining our strategy for the future, this opens up whole new vistas. There are many areas of vital importance to our prospective enemy all around his periphery, which offer inviting and profitable points of attack. There are many areas in which fighting could be prosecuted with small forces in such manner as to greatly weaken him. There are routes over which he could be invaded in force in such manner as to sever main lines of land communication to his armies. There are other possibilities of invasion by massive forces which would outflank the main efforts in which he is engaged. I believe that we should look forward to employing on a global scale the advantage that sea power gives to us in exercising the strategic initiative wherever around his total periphery it is advantageous for us to attack—whether it be by bombardment, by raid, by expeditions of limited scope with limited objectives, or by movement of massive forces which can invade and occupy strategic positions vital to him in any further prosecution of the war by him.

Although our enemy has practically unlimited resources in manpower, his material resources for making war and the industrial capacity and transportation facilities required to replace his equipment and to replenish his stockpiles of war material and supplies are very strictly limited. These limitations and our attack on his limited resources, however, are meaningless unless by fighting we compel him to dissipate and deplete them. It is to our advantage that the localities in which this fighting occurs should be so chosen as to yield to us the most advantage, to him the least. Fortunately, his long frontier, varied terrain and extensive coast line offer many such opportunities.

I hope that we will all come to understand the nature of our adversary. By personal experience in official dealings, I early (1946) became convinced of his complete and utter unreliability. Study of his declarations of policy for world domination and a careful examination of his every act in the post-war period should leave no doubts of his evil intentions and his long-range plot to achieve our destruction. Professor James Burnham says, in an excellent lecture at the Naval War College, that Communism is not a philosophy, not a political party; it *is* an organization, an enterprise, a new kind of army, a secular religion, and a conspiracy. Our enemy is ruthless, relentless, and implacable.

There is one more point I should like to stress at this time. Our discussions here this week have as one premise a possible global war. This is essential to these discussions. That is the nature of our profession. This is a War College and we must study war.

But you should not conclude from this that we either expect or desire a global war. We all hope that it may be avoided (at least, for many years) and I can say with assurance that every one of us in uniform fervently prays that it can be avoided—with honor, of course. Planning for the conduct of war is a requirement of our profession.

In both World Wars and in the recent war in Korea, the outbreak of hostilities found us woefully unprepared for the type of conflict, the scope of the war and the character of the fighting. These repeated instances of a habitual state of unpreparedness can be attributed to several factors: lack of realization of the dangerous position in which the United States had been placed by world events; insufficient appreciation of the great extent of our interests; lack of the military policy that was strong enough to support our total contemporary foreign policy; and an inadequate or tardy implementation of the advance preparations that were necessary to meet the impending emergency. As a result, we have narrowly

averted disaster. The danger was potential, but inevitably approaching, in the case of World War I; glaring and imminent in the case of World War II; and, on a smaller scale, no less real in the war in Korea.

We cannot say that we have not been warned by many of our most eminent statesmen from Washington to Eisenhower and always by our most eminent soldiers from General Washington to General MacArthur—sailors from Paul Jones to Nimitz. Even one of our greatest war Presidents, Woodrow Wilson, with about two years' unmistakable warning, could not waken the nation to a realization of its danger nor quicken it to take the (by then) emergency measures necessary in preparation for the war that was sure to follow. However, to his everlasting credit, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to remedy the situation of military weakness in which he found the nation upon assuming office and made great strides in the two years preceding the outbreak of hostilities.

Military policy needs to embrace other important factors in our present-day world, due to our position of leadership and power in it. Some of the other problems that must be solved in order that the policy can encompass the whole of the military situation and include all forms of warfare will be enumerated. For example:

How much of our annual national income will be expended for military purposes?

What proportion of our military budget will go to building and maintaining our own establishment and what for military aid to our allies?

What will we spend for development of new weapons; how fast should the perfected new weapons be produced; at what point will we shift production to a still newer weapon in each category; what will we spend on nuclear weapons, will they displace the conventional ones and how fast and how completely?

What is the proper proportion between our land forces, naval forces and air forces?

What mass of our force can we afford to deploy abroad and what should be maintained at home in a high state of readiness to act as a global strategic reserve?

What is the proportion between offensive aircraft, support aircraft and aircraft for the passive defensive?

The policy must be as complex as warfare itself has become.

It can readily be seen that it is closely affected by considerations of foreign policy and strategy.

One great apostle of preparedness, President Theodore Roosevelt, counselled: "Speak softly, but carry a big stick."

Since the end of World War II and our immediate demobilization to the point of military impotency, we have been in need of a rational, consistent, military policy that realistically supports our position in the post-war world. We know pretty well what our general objectives are. Fundamentally, we want to preserve our existence and our way of life. We want on a larger scale to preserve freedom in the world, because the loss of it anywhere threatens it here. The lines are clearly drawn. How are we to accomplish our aims? It will help if we have a fitting military policy and implement it—progressively and with constant determination.

We must be ready, should war be forced upon us, to begin fighting an all-out war or, alternatively, to fight minor wars (like that in Korea), which might result from an attempt at piecemeal aggression or enemy attack upon critically sensitive areas. The peacetime standing military forces and the support ready to be given to them must provide the means for continuing any current war, such as Korea. They must be prepared to assume, as well, the

load of the initial phases of a general outbreak of war with a major enemy. At the same time, our standing forces must provide the base and the nucleas of the greatly enlarged establishments that would be required to win a general conflict, the mobilization and training bases for the future armies, fleets and air forces.

Another important element of a state of readiness is the achievement of an acceptable mobilization base for the nation itself, for its economy, for its industry, for its total ultimate power for waging successful war.

Meanwhile, we must build up our allies so that they may be able to defend themselves with better hope of success. We hope to do this with no greatly augmented help from us, either in very much larger peacetime U. S. military forces deployed abroad, or any greatly increased military aid, or any long-continued financial transfusions. During this long-term phase, which will in this instance be inclusive of the short and medium-term phases, we should provide for a continuous, progressive replacement of obsolete and obsolescent military equipment, lest we be stuck with an out-of-date, inadequate military machine. This replacement, modernizing and regenerative process, must take place at a tempo that will exceed that required in any past experience of ours. Required now is a series of advanced types of equipment flowing from the research stage through development and engineering, test and evaluation, adaptation for use in service, production in quantity and application to a projected, large-scale employment in training or in actual active operations.

We must include the re-building of a psychological readiness on the part of our people to accept sacrifices, rigors and hardships with constancy and determination. Such would imply service in our Armed Forces of a great deal of our young manhood for adequate periods of training, and it would require a tough and enduring spirit on their part. I would not doubt the devotion of our young men.

We cannot simplify our problems by setting our sights for a definitely determined date for mobilization day nor by deciding that we will be fully prepared on mobilization day. We must reach the mobilization basis as soon as may be, but not by prejudicing the achievement of the character of the result sought, not by such haste as to produce vast waste, not at the expense of our national economic and social well-being. We must prepare our mobilization base with the expectation that it will provide the means for expanding to the upper limit of our war-making capacity within a reasonable period after the outbreak of war and at the greatest rate of acceleration consistent with attaining the ultimate limit. We must not injure and hamper our efforts by over-emphasis or exclusive emphasis on any one of these factors at the expense of any or all of the others. We must have a broad consideration of the problem in all of its parts.

The *military position*—call it "preparedness," "posture of defense"—of the United States has vastly improved in the past two and one-half years, not in all aspects but certainly as to the over-all relative, immediately available strength and as to that which could be quickly mobilized. Compared to their military situation in 1947, our allies have greatly increased both their ready strength and their potential. The military strength of these nations adds greatly to the combined allied strength, because the forces of our European and Asiatic allies are already overseas, sometimes actually deployed into a future theater of suppositious operations or actually fighting beside us, as in Korea. Indigenous troops are much more economically supported and maintained abroad in peacetime or in war than a similar number of our own troops.

It is now generally admitted that the real foundation of the Military Power of the Western World is dependent upon the total Military Potential of the United States itself. Such understanding is not enough, because it is not so clear to all that the United States must itself maintain ready Armed Forces to help bear the brunt of the early fighting if war should break out and

our allies be suddenly attacked. In the early stages of a war, we must help immediately or risk losing the war at the outset. Another time, we cannot rely entirely—for protection and the time in which to arm—upon the Navy and Air Force of Great Britain and upon the armies of the Continental nations to hold Fortress Europe unaided while we take several years to prepare behind such a shield.

It seems to me that one of our greatest needs is a continuing and steady military policy that would provide the level of military forces and the military resources which would support a strong and determined national policy. Such strength—both ready and potential—will support our diplomacy in peace and would provide the means of executing a winning strategy in case of war. To bring about such a condition the people of the United States must understand what are our national aims, what is the extent of the military strength which must be maintained in order to back them up, and what the cost will be. Let us not falter now.

President Eisenhower said that "the only way to avoid a world war is to win the cold war." Results in this will depend to a large degree upon the soundness of our military policy and our success in implementing its programs. I am confident that the American Public will willingly bear the burden of indispensable armaments, instead of incurring the risks of losing a war or the penalties and price of winning a war. I am certain that we can preserve the peace only by being militarily strong and that to be weak invites aggression and attack. Let us be unafraid to be strong.

ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered by
at the Naval War College
on 5 May 1953 by
Dr. Charles F. Roos

Gentlemen:

The problem given to me today is a very broad one. In fact, I think it is entirely too broad for a lecture confined to 40-50 minutes. I have chosen only three aspects, each of which I will develop in some detail. Perhaps in the Question Period some other aspects can be considered.

First, I want to talk about Economic Warfare by the Soviets. That, naturally, means that we will have to examine the Soviet economy. We will have to see what they are capable of and what they are not.

Secondly (and this is related to the first), I want to talk about the Industrial Potentials and the Resources for War of the Soviets, Ourselves and Our Allies.

Thirdly, I want to talk about the Domestic Economy of the Two Major Nations and some of the problems which they have to face.

The first subject requires a few comparisons. You have probably seen most or all of these some place or other, but it would be just as well to review them here.

RAW MATERIALS—ANNUAL PRODUCTION

	U. S. S. R. (Approximately)	United States (Approximately)
Coal	354 million tons	500 million tons
Petroleum	45 " "	326 " "

	U. S. S. R. (Approximately)	United States (Approximately)
Pig Iron and Ferroalloys (This is entirely different from Steel; our Steel is nearer 120 than the figure of 70. Steel is made from pig iron and scrap steel and iron)	27 million tons	70 million tons
Aluminum	250 thousand tons	1,300,000 tons
Cotton Textile Industry	5½ billion sq. yd.	9½-10 billion sq. yd.
Cars and Trucks	700 thousand per yr.	7 million per yr.

These are basic economic factors. How, under such conditions, can the Soviet hope to compete with us? In each of the major categories we outclass them by quite a bit.

But there are other problems which are involved. One of these is the long transportation which we must meet in our operations in contrast to their nearness to areas of aggression, trouble, or whatever name you choose.

Up until 1950—in fact, up until the Korean War started—the Russians were able to increase their supply of civilian goods each year, a fact which shows in their published figures on production and in their price actions. In each of the years from 1947 on to 1950, around the first of March, they reduced prices of consumers' goods about 10%. They were able to reduce prices because their productivity or output per man-hour was increasing at the rate of something like 12% a year in those years. That 12% for productivity increase is a very high figure; it should be compared, for example, with our long-term average of about 2%. We have attained a short-term average of as high as 10-12% for a year or two at the most. Indeed, when we have increased our own productivity by as much as 10%, it has been accomplished by closing down high-cost plants, and one can hardly call that an overall increase.

With respect to productivity, there is no question but what the Soviet economy has been improving very substantially. Improvement really goes back to about 1935-36, when they began to turn away from compulsory methods to incentive methods; when they put through their Stakhanovite System, for example. From the beginning of their five-year plans in 1928 they began to open up the spread between wages in a plant and management, between artists, scientists and management, and the ordinary workers. As a result of such changes in policy, we find that productivity increased very substantially in the Soviet Union.

Planned increases of the Soviets for the five-year period, 1951-55, are 9% a year. They have probably just about accomplished such an increase in productivity for 1951-52, but I believe they are a little bit short of it. My studies indicate that instead of 9% they probably came out with something between 7½-8%—but, then, that is hardly enough to quarrel about. Even 7½% is a rather substantial increase and I think it has some implications, certainly, over the long run.

Ever since 1928 (when the Soviet Five-Year Plans were started), Soviet productivity has increased on the average about 7½% a year. Productivity actually went down during the war rather considerably. The high rates after the war were due, primarily, to the fact that they were opening up bottlenecks. Furthermore, they were importing machinery and equipment from Germany and from some of the other European countries—and this provided a short cut. I don't believe that the Russians can maintain the 7½% increase in productivity of the past 25 years—I think that the increases are more apt to stabilize around 4% annually.

But if the Russians should be able to stabilize their annual increases in productivity around 7% and our productivity increase per year should drop to 1½% (that is, from 2 to 1½%), then, in 1970, industrial productivity would be equal in Russia and the United States.

If Russian industrial productivity should equal our own, there is no question but that Russia would be the most powerful industrial nation in the world. The Russians have a larger population than the United States and as a result they have a larger labor supply. Consequently, Russia would be the most powerful nation in the world under these conditions.

On the other hand, if the Russian productivity should increase at only 4% per year and ours at 2%, by 1970 theirs would still be only three-fifths of our own. That is the other more hopeful side. I think that a 4% increase for them is a more reasonable assumption than the other one. Yet, of course, military people have to look out for the worst so I put the unfavorable hypothesis first for that particular reason.

The Russians have been finding, since 1950, considerable difficulty in meeting their armament plans and improving the lot of the civilian. For example, there was no price reduction in March of 1951. There was no decrease in prices on March 1, 1952; and, yet, there was no significant rise in wages. Thus, one can assume that their increase in productivity was absorbed by the military program—that is the only way such a condition could develop since the government budget was about balanced.

In 1953, March 1 passed without a price increase. But about that time certain other important developments begun to unfold. For example, Joseph Stalin died. There must have been some internal trouble, for on April 1, 1953, the new government again reduced prices. I don't believe that the reduction was a result of productivity increasing enough to offset the military expenditures. I think that, instead, the reduction was forced by economic dissatisfaction at home. It is rather hard to keep people static, particularly if they have low standards of living. They become dissatisfied very quickly.

There are, of course, some things in which Russia has been going ahead very fast—particularly, through the efforts of the satellites. For example, the Russians have asked the Czechs, the Poles, and various others to supply them with certain civilian goods in return for Russian machinery and equipment. As a result of that trade deal, the plans of the satellites show very substantial step-ups in production of civilian goods. I think if you would analyze the Russian satellite trade agreements, you would have to conclude that the price paid by the satellites was rather high—that is, that the satellites did not get advantageous trade terms.

There is further evidence which I think may be helpful to us in formulating policy. There is, for example, very definite evidence that the Russians have experienced during the past year short supplies of iron, molybdenum, cobalt, tin, tungsten and nickel.

In the case of iron, there is evidence that the mines of Magnitogorsk are badly depleted and the Russians have been increasing production of low-grade ore at Alapayevsk and Ayat, in the Urals. To mine this low-grade ore requires a considerable amount of special work—magnetic separation is necessary and the ore must be sintered, or joined together in pellets to make it useful. The Russians are again working Krivoy Rog's marginal ores and the Kerch low-grade deposits in Crimea are scheduled to be reopened. The Russians are even working iron deposits in the Arctic in a place called Yeno and hauling the ore 800 miles for processing. It seems that such a situation alone indicates that they are under pressure with respect to the important element of iron. As an offset, you should bear in mind that the civilian uses of iron by the Soviets are relatively small compared with our own. Consequently, they can put a greater proporiton, quite a bit of their resources, into armaments and military production. Vanadium has been substituted for both molybdenum and tungsten in steel used for tools and machinery. Moreover, iron has been substituted for steel in a number of instances.

Transportation is rather inadequate in Soviet Russia. The ton-mileage on their railroads, for example, is 40% higher than on our own for each unit of production. When we each produce a ton of goods, they will haul it 40% more miles than we will. Such a long haul is quite a strain on any transportation system and it is a good thing to bear in mind. In case we should become involved in war, we could cause much difficulty by messing up their already burdened transportation system.

You will find that the Russians have had trouble with their labor supply. Labor has not been available for certain things that seem to have needed help. For example, in 1951, employment in manufacturing, mining and utilities was increased—but not in construction. Yet, there are three people to every room in Russia. Such crowding hardly represents a good standard of living. Again, the labor supply was not increased in transportation (which I have already indicated in inadequate) nor in the service industries. On the other hand, agriculture received 24% more gear tractors than in 1950, presumably to free farm labor.

I believe that Russia, as of now, is incapable of any serious economic warfare on us. I think that sustained full-scale war would be very difficult.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Russians could divert their efforts to the production of such things as consumers' goods, particularly textiles, clothing, and some of the other things which are already in adequate or full supply in the world. By flooding world markets, they could bring on business recessions that might be embarrassing to us. That is one possibility, but I believe that it is unlikely. Their own needs are too pressing at the present time to allow them to do much in the way of economic warfare.

I have tried to find areas in which the Russians might be able to hurt us, economically, and I find it extremely dif-

ficult. Of course, there are products here and there which we used to get from Russia. But we have found substitute sources in the last four or five years. As of now, it would be very difficult for the Russians to wage successful economic warfare on us.

I think that longer range problems are, however, very important. I touched on the fact that the Russians have incentive systems which have been leading to substantial increases in production per man-hour. In contrast, our whole tendency has been in the opposite direction. We have taxes that are almost wholly income taxes. The fellow who is good enough to make the income pays the taxes; the fellow who loses, who is incompetent and has little or no income, is taken care of on relief. In New York State, encouragement is given to those who quit work and take up relief. That is hardly a system likely to achieve the greatest productivity or production per man-hour.

In Russia, personal income taxes range from about 1½% to 12% of income. An executive who would be making the equivalent of, say, $100,000 a year in this country would be paying the 12% income tax; the marginal worker would be paying the 1%. The average income tax is about 8%. Please don't misunderstand me —I am not defending the Russians; I'm merely trying to compare situations and to point out long-run implications unfavorable to us.

There is a very sizeable sales tax in Russia. It amounts, on the average, to about one-third of the selling price of the goods. In effect, such a tax is a tax on spending rather than on income. As an economic force, it is much more desirable than an income tax—particularly if we want greater productivity and higher standards of living. I am, of course, not saying that we should have a 35% tax on sales—the people here would not accept it, or anything like it; you know that as well as I do. But, I do think that our emphasis has been in the wrong direction. The burden of taxes ought to be redistributed so that the fellow who is really more

productive than his associates, who has ideas, and who can get along, could be rewarded a little better.

Furthermore, I do not see why the Treasury should be concerned about the period chosen for depreciation. After all, the Treasury is going to be collecting taxes for a very long time. Does anybody doubt that? What difference does it make whether the taxes are collected this year, next year, or the year after? And yet, it does make a very considerable difference in the incentive to invest and the development of new techniques, new ideas, and in the over-all problem of productivity. If the economic horizon is low, high rates of write-off can induce investment and the result be better standards of living.

There is another important area in which we suffer handicaps—that is in the area of world trade. There are no tariffs in the Communist Bloc. In contrast, in the United States and among its Allies, tariffs are important factors limiting markets. They tend to shut out and insulate markets so that in each, production is for a very small market. What the Europeans have recently been doing is setting up plants—and then looking towards the United States for markets. Yet, world markets could be more easily expanded and trade facilitated by the letting down of tariff barriers in Europe and other places.

I have indicated here some of the problems and some of the areas in which we may be able to improve our own lot. I am sure that our potential for production of both civilian and military goods in this country is sufficiently high—and can be made higher—so that we can have a preparedness program that will always be much in advance of anything that the Russians can achieve. In addition, we can still have a civilian economy that grows. I am sure that we have sufficient built-up capital, accumulated ideas, know-how, techniques, and so on to enable us to accomplish this aim. Consequently, from the point of view of potentials, I am not at all worried about the outcome. I think that we can be sufficiently

armed and otherwise prepared that Russia will be unable to match us—because if she should try, she would experience a break-down in her own economy.

The Russians are already suffering from some of the containment which we have imposed and which we hope will later on lead to a settlement of the problems without war. Increased pressure in the direction of cutting off essential imports from the West will cause increased trouble and a greater desire to settle basic problems without recourse to war. But at the same time, our own attitudes must be such as to show the Russian people that we can be friendly and helpful to a Russia that shows willingness to turn away from aggression.

What I have told you indicates that I believe that we are about ready to win the conflict with Russia. However, we must not let down our guard at this point and the armament program of the United States for the next year or two (possibly three) will have to be a forward-looking one. First, we cannot tolerate inefficiencies—whether they are in the industrial plant, the armed services, or in other departments of government. We will have to work against inefficiencies wherever they appear. We could then look forward to producing the most modern weapons in adequate supply to meet contingencies. At the same time, our civilian economy could grow. We would win the economic war with the Soviets and get peace on terms acceptable to us. For emphasis, let me say again it is highly important that we not jump immediately into large-scale disarmament. The military program should be kept near the current rate, at least through the fiscal year 1954. We can take another look later on to see whether we can safely move in the direction of disarmament.

The domestic economies of nations other than the United States and Russia are varied. They run all the way from almost capitalistic economies—like our own, with a minimum of regulation —to almost communistic economies like Russia. I said "almost,"

for there are many gradations both on the side of the United States and of the Soviets.

It is possible, within any economy, to have a mixed system. There are certain areas in which government investment or government control of activities are accepted features. There are other areas in which private enterprise functions best.

Specifically, the Yugoslav economy which is identified as one of our allies is a communistic one; and we also have very capitalistic economies like Canada and Mexico. The system in Russia itself is, moreover, nothing like the Communistic economy visualized by Lenin, Trotsky, or any of the other early Russians. The Russian economy has come a long way from their conceptions and I am confident that it will progress further in our direction.

The economic differences are principally concerned with matters of emphasis. Over here, we tolerate socialism; and, in fact, we encourage it in many cases. When I was a little boy private roads were still quite common, but we hardly think in terms of them any more. All can remember when the private school was much more important than it is today. We have come a long way from the commonplace of 25 to 50 years ago.

The American economy, with its gradations from strict socialism with respect to public relief to, say, almost unadulterated capitalism in the case of the extractive industries where the government is not particularly concerned about taxes and the industries do about as they please with respect to depreciation, contains many gradations. Similar gradations exist in other countries. Among our immediate allies, there is England—much more socialistic than we are, for her key industries are under control. Yet, in England there are still many areas of free enterprise left. France is even more socialistic than England, and Norway and Sweden probably even more so. One could actually arrange our allies ac-

cording to a scale showing their degree of socialization. The dividing lines in many cases would be indistinct or blurred.

The communist nations also show somewhat similar gradations. There was a time when the Russian government decreed that even farming should be communistic and many kulaks who objected were actually liquidated. Private industry was forbidden—the state had to do everything. Well, those times have changed. At present, anyone in Russia can hire three people and can make anything in competition with the state and sell it in the markets. That is hardly enterprise as we know it, but at least it is a start in our direction. Today, the farmer is almost left alone provided he can get along with three helpers and does not cause trouble for the state.

Today, the Russians have great difficulty in getting their plant managers to adhere to the state plans. The Russians have the same kind of cheating that we have had here under controls. For example, the Russian plant managers given a plan will resort to almost everything, including bribery, to get the banks to finance them to a greater extent than planned so that they can put on regular payrolls what is actually construction labor. Various deviations of that sort have caused trouble. People—whatever their nationality—want to be independent, to do things their own way rather than to be told how to do them by the state.

We will find among the communist states, an increasing trend toward our own form of economy; that is, there will be more freedom for the individual, more encouragement of enterprise, perhaps over-all plans with less of the direct controls than we have seen in the past. This is not a new thought. If you should resurrect the old N. R. A. files—if they still exist—you would find a memorandum dated February or early March of 1934 in which I considered problems of socialism and enterprise economies. I said that over a period of fifty years you would probably be unable to recognize the difference between our own economy and the

one that started out in Russia as a communist economy. It said that the communists would have to turn to the incentive methods of the enterprise system, and that our own system would extend the areas of government control. Development of incentives in Russia would almost inevitably result in complexity and a lessened need for government controls.

We will agree that we have come a long way toward socialism. We are not there by any means, but we have taken a number of steps along the road towards socialism in this country. Similarly, the communists have come a long way from the type of organization outlined in the doctrine of Lenin and Trotsky. There are still about thirty-one years to go.

I have spent so much time on this point because I believe that the critical period in our dealings with Russia is going to be of a short duration. I would not want you to think that what you will have to do for the next two or three years will determine what you will have to do the next ten, twenty, or thirty years. I think the problem is to get by during the next three years; to maintain our strength and our positions; to understand what we are driving at and why. Perhaps only two years represent the critical period, possibly only one. Time only will give the answer. It would be a serious mistake to set up communism as a hundred-year enemy. Long before the century has passed, even long before this generation has passed (the children that are now born), there will be more important worries than Soviet Russia.

One can always plan for the long run by negotiating successfully the short run. If one takes the short steps unerringly, he must come out alright in the long run. Over the short run it is highly important to maintain our military strength, perhaps even to increase it. Notice I said "strength" rather than "expenditures." As I tried to indicate early in my lecture, there may be an important difference.

It is extremely important that we do certain things to increase our productivity. These should be made important aims of the government itself and of the people.

A few years ago, the General Motors Company concluded a labor agreement that specifically rewarded productivity. Up to that time, the labor unions generally were very little interested in improving productivity. But once it was put into a contract and wage increases were automatically based on it, the story was different. This is extremely significant from the long-run point of view.

We ought also examine our whole tax structure with the aim of providing greater incentives to successful persons and corporations. In particular, the Treasury should get out of the business of trying to tell business how to set up its depreciation accounts.

By fixing the weak points in our economic system, we ought to be able to win both the armament race and the economic marathon.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Roos was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on May 18, 1901. He attended Rice Institute Houston, Texas, receiving a B. A. degree in 1921, M. A. in 1924, and Ph.D. in 1926. In 1926-27, he did graduate work at the University of Chicago, and at Princeton University in 1927-28.

He began his career as a teaching assistant in mathematics at Rice Institute in 1920. From 1921 to 1923, he was a civil engineer and contractor, returning to Rice in 1924 as a teaching fellow. From 1926-28, he was a National Research Council fellow in mathematics and from 1928-31 was an Assistant Professor of Mathematics at Cornell University. From 1928-33, Dr. Roos

was with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, serving first as Secretary of Section K (1928-31) and as permanent Secretary and a member of the Executive Committee from 1931-33. He was a Guggenheim fellow from April to July, 1933, following which he became Principal Economist and Director of Research for N. R. A. In 1934, he went to Colorado College as Professor of Econometrics, remaining there until 1947. He is now President of the Econometric Institute.

Dr. Roos is a joint-founder of the Econometric Society, of which he is Vice President and a fellow, having served as Secretary-Treasurer in 1931-32, Secretary and member of the Council of the President in 1948. He is a member of numerous professional and scientific organizations—such as the International Statistics Institute, American Mathematics Society, and the Mathematics Association of America. He serves as a member of the advisory editorial board for *Econometrica*.

Dr. Roos is the author of several books on economics and a contributor to various scientific journals. He is interested in research concerned chiefly with the technique of statistics and analysis and development of mathematical theories of dynamic economics.



GROUP SESSION

STRATEGIC SERVICES IN 'COLD WAR'

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 May 1953 by
Major General William J. Donovan, U. S. A. (Ret.)

One of the most ruthless despots in the history of the world has been dead for several weeks. The debate continues to rage as to whether the 'cold war' which he initiated will slow down or turn into a 'hot war.' 'Hot' or 'cold,' everyone agrees that it is a war. Whether it is fought on the battlefield of Korea or in the ballot boxes of Italy, it remains a war which involves the survival of the kind of life we want to live.

We are now confronted by a new tactic in this struggle—a new offensive called a *peace offensive.* I can only pray that we shall not be deluded by our own hopes. To avoid such a delusion, there are three things we should remember:—

One is that the goal of the Communists has not changed. Have they disavowed their aim of violent revolution? Have they withdrawn their political paratroops from behind our lines? They have not. If there is one constant in Communist dogma, it is that the ultimate goal must always be world domination.

A *second* thing to remember is that while tactics may change, Communist methods do not disappear. Conspiracy, subversion and lies remain the weapons in their arsenal and they will continue to be used wherever they can be most effectively employed.

And, *thirdly,* let us not fool ourselves into thinking that Malenkov stands ready to throw out 30 years of Communist education so as to embrace the West in sympathetic understanding. If he is anything, he is a trained and loyal disciple of Stalin. Malenkov did not accept control of the Soviet regime to destroy it.

Let us also remember this: Whatever the Soviet motives, their peace offensive is well timed—not only to jeopardize the whole fabric of our European defense, but also to upset our efforts in the Far East. Our own government is under severe pressure to reduce military and foreign spending; and, if this happens, our material and mental preparedness will be reduced accordingly. The power struggle continues and this new offensive can be even more dangerous to our goals than a full-fledged military campaign.

The terms of President Eisenhower has set down as the only basis on which he would conclude a political settlement are terms which it is unlikely the Communists will accept. They are terms dictated from a position of strength; terms demanding that the Soviet octopus draw back its arms on all sides—in Asia, and in Europe. The President has made it plain that the peace he seeks is not the peace of weakness, appeasement, or surrender.

Let us look first at the problem of Asia. The seizure of China was for Communism a major victory. The full consequences of that triumph have yet to unfold, not alone in China but throughout Asia and the rest of the world.

In China, we see an economic and social revolution of those who sought to escape from their wretchedness. The Kremlin, through the Chinese Communist Army, has exploited this upsurge.

Even at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917, the Soviets had their eye on China. Stalin nurtured and increased the Chinese Red Army from 25,000 in 1937 to a force of 300,0000 in 1945. In the conquest of China, that was the heart of his strategy.

Once China is consolidated, Stalin's conquest will be extended throughout Southeast Asia, down the same path the Japanese followed through Indo-China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma—all the way to India.

India is a country of great economic potential. It has a reservoir of high-class military manpower. With Ceylon, it dominates the Indian Ocean and the vital sea lanes between Europe, Asia and the Far East. Once Asia is secured, the Communist forces can be turned against Europe and the United States.

How can we prevent the Kremlin from consolidating its gains in the Far East?

Let us try to answer this question in terms of a 'cold war' —the war we are already in—and let us appraise the weapons we have, apart from those of a conventional shooting war. The manpower can come from those countries whose leaders recognize the common interest we share with them. We ask in Asia the same questions that we asked in Europe: "Are you prepared to fight for your own liberties? Are you ready to resist your conqueror?"

Propaganda, properly used, can be a very important stimulus in arousing resistance movements on the mainland—whether by radios, pamphlets or leaflets.

The world should know that, while much must still be done, a well-conducted economic and military aid program has been set up to improve conditions in Formosa and reorganize the Chinese Nationalist forces.

It should be stressed also that under direction of American officers the Chinese troops on Formosa are being supplied with modern arms and equipment and that Chinese guerrilla forces are active on the mainland of China.

Operational nuclei can be organized—small, well-trained, well-screened cadres of men—to train and activate a resistance force which in turn could organize the countryside. The active support of the people is the first aim. Also, as was done by General Chennault in the last war in setting up the Flying Tigers, a volunteer international air force could be established in Formosa.

There are many regions in China which offer ideal areas for resistance organization due to their topography, tradition and the independence of their people.

China will not fall into our hands like a ripe pear. Were we to make public evidence of our belief that this could happen, it would be viewed by the Chinese Communist as weakness on our part.

With Communist China, as with the Soviet Union, we should harbor no hopes as to the chance of winning it as a friend or ally—our aim should be to halt and prevent Mao's expansionism.

Unconventional methods alone can not overcome Communist China. We, as a people, are inclined to rely upon some single gadget for victory. Some think guerrilla warfare alone could do it; others think propaganda is the one effective device. No single measure is enough. But if we make a fist of all our resources—propaganda, deception, ideology, sabotage, guerrilla tactics and the threat of military support—then, every blow would carry a real impact. Such a program would at least delay the consolidation of Communist power; slow up the advance of Communists in Southeast Asia; provide safe areas in the interior for Nationalist units; bring constant headaches to Red authority and breed chaos and confusion.

With that as our objective, our immediate job is to bolster the countries on China's rim, to reveal the Kremlin's aims for what they are, and to show them that their real and present danger is Soviet imperialism. Our task is not only to provide the weapons of war where that can be done, but also the constructive, humanitarian aid that no one else in the world—certainly not Mao—can give them: medicines, for example, and education in the cure of tropical diseases.

The villages of Asia cannot be defended or liberated by military means alone.

Chiang Kai-shek's failure to carry out the land reform which Sun Yat-sen considered imperative was a decisive factor in swinging peasant sympathy to the Communists. When the Communists conquered China, they immediately distributed the land. The Communists implemented a land reform in North Korea as early as March, 1946; while in South Korea, the reform of 1948 affected only former Japanese property. The more comprehensive general reform of June, 1949, passed after considerable American prodding of a pro-landlord government, was not yet put into force when the war began.

A policy of radical agrarian change need be no monopoly of the Kremlin-dominated world. We can do as much; indeed, we can do better! In post-war Japan, a comprehensive land reform which satisfied the peasants was carried out in October, 1946—almost as early as the North Korean reform. Such a program, extended to other lands and implemented by technical assistance, is Point Four; not in lofty aspirations for the future, but in terms of the present practical need for a pair of pants, a bowl of rice and a chance for a healthy body. As an example, read the reports of the effect of new-found drugs in arresting tuberculosis in Korea where there has always been a high incidence of that disease.

And while we instruct them in the cure of their ills, we can teach them to defend themselves. We can bring them tough guerrilla fighters to teach them tough guerrilla fighting. We can provide the equipment, the arms, the radios, the printing presses, the teachers of new methods in industry, farming and schooling. Without these, plans and blueprints will be wasted.

You don't measure the success of irregular warfare in terms of battles won and cities destroyed. You don't hope to meet and defeat a powerful enemy in the field. In irregular war, the object is delay; the tactic, hit-and-run again and again; the targets, the small enemy forces, the weak convoy—to breed in the mind of the individual enemy the sense of isolation and the fear of

capture. It was that kind of war that defeated Napoleon in Spain and knocked him out in Russia.

Let me give you a few examples of what I have in mind. During World War II, in every trouble spot the details of our problem were different. The Japanese, for instance, had overrun Siam. Because of Siam's central strategic position in Southeast Asia, it was essential for us to establish information sources there. At the request of the Siamese government, we had trained 40 Siamese in America in the various techniques of guerrilla warfare, dropped them with 40 Americans behind the Japanese lines into Siam, and from them gathered priceless information of enemy intentions. The Siamese prime minister was skilled in this kind of warfare. In his own palace, he gave shelter and protection for O. S. S. men and set up a radio transmitter by which daily reports were sent to Washington by way of Ceylon.

In China, at the request of Chiang Kai-shek, we trained commando units based on the operations of Lawrence of Arabia. But where Lawrence used horses and camels, we used jeeps and parachutes.

We armed and equipped Kachin and Karen tribes in North Burma to fight, harass and delay Japanese troops of occupation. These tribes were trained by Americans skilled in communications, sabotage and secret intelligence. In that area, a volunteer native force of 12,000 fighting men were loyal to us throughout the war.

We also were in contact with Chinese pirates and guerrillas in the mountainous coastal regions on each side of the Fukien-Kwangtung border north of Swatow and south of Foochow. These pirates had been operating for years in defiance of local, provincial and national Chinese authorities. They were eager and willing to carry out attacks on the Japanese with our help. As a result, we were able to post radios aboard their junks. We gave them limpets

which were used to blow up Japanese ships in their ports. With imaginative leadership, they would be as willing to help us now as they were then.

Asia is one strategic theatre of which Korea, Indo-China, Malaya and the Philippines are as integral a part as are Siam, Indonesia, Burma and India.

A Pacific pact is as essential in our over-all defense as is a NATO pact in the Atlantic. Urgency requires we take the initiative in obtaining the cooperation of other nations to make such a pact effective.

Asia is one problem, pressing and immediate, but Asia is not all. The unorthodox war must be fought simultaneously in Europe in three different areas:

(1) Inside the Soviet Union itself;

(2) In the satellite countries already enslaved; and

(3) In the countries of Western Europe which stand in the Kremlin's path of expansion.

In each area, though the methods vary, the goal is the same: to prevent Soviet expansion and consolidation; to give moral and physical support to our allies and to keep the enemy off-balance until the Free Nations are strong.

This kind of war is a brave man's war and a poor man's war. It doesn't cost billions and it doesn't fill large cemeteries, but its results can be incalculable. We can put our people into countries behind the Iron Curtain, not to arouse the population to premature and futile revolt when they have no weapons, but to foment unrest and discontent, and sustain hope.

Within the area of the Soviet Union, the Soviet's concern as to their people's unity discloses a weakness ripe for exploitation.

The jugular vein in this war is the Russian people. For the past few years, disaffected elements within the population of the Soviet Union and its satellites have run great risks to escape into the American zone. They have taken these risks even though they were uncertain as to their reception by Americans or that they would be turned back by them to the Soviet authorities.

At the end of the war, the United States had discouraged and largely dissipated the potential of the Soviet emigration. As a result of the exchange agreement concluded at Yalta, the great mass of Soviet PW's and forced laborers in Western Europe, numbering more than 2 million, were sent back to the U. S. S. R.—in many cases over their violent objections. It is only within the past two years that the principle of political asylum has gradually reasserted itself—at first, clandestinely, and recently more openly. But let us not forget that if political asylum is to be meaningful, it must be accomplished by the food, the clothing, the medical supplies necessary to enable the escapes to undertake the reconstruction of shattered lives. Let me tell you what a group of Americans are doing in this respect:

"The American Friends of Russian Freedom" is a voluntary non-governmental American committee working on behalf of post-war Soviet escapees in Germany. No other agency could do this job because no other agency has the political, psychological and moral assets accruing to the independent operation of a private American committee concerned exclusively with Russians seeking their freedom. Their confidence in the ability and good faith of American citizens is of great importance. Especially so, after the rejection and indifference which has marked our policy toward the Russian people.

Apart from the humanitarian aspect, it is a psychological weapon in our hands to be able to establish housing projects, employment opportunities, agricultural training schools, and permanent resettlements on individual farms.

The French government has already encouraged refugee resettlement projects. France is said to have thousands of abandoned farms, a large percentage of which were given up only because there were no male children left in the remaining family to work the farm. About 50% of the post-war Russian escapees are of peasant origin, born and brought up in agricultural areas —usually, on collective farms. Most of these men have escaped from the Soviet army where they had been taken into military service with no training other than farming.

And more than this—the Moslems of South Central Asia differ from the Russians in religion, family history, language, customs, and way of life, and have a long tradition of open opposition to their Russian conquerors.

After thirty years of pressure, the Soviets have failed to remodel these peoples of Central Asia. The Soviets still encounter opposition there which can be used against them.

This program of inducement organized in depth in the countries of the West, propagandized in truth, could be a heavy blow to the Soviets. It would intensify their continuing fear of revolt, a fear inherent in all power that is founded on force.

In the satellite area, the same effort should be made to encourage escapees. It is easier to reach and help people in an occupied country when they have been conscripted into the enemy army than it is to reach those who have gone underground. If a patriot is drafted into the army of an invader, he is a patriot still. He is, therefore, not only a source of information but also a means of carrying words of hope to those in the underground. The possibilities are exemplified in the instance of the young Polish flyer who recently escaped in a jet plane to Denmark.

Also, on the continent of Europe, we can help those who have escaped imprisonment and who are prepared to build up in the Free West an international volunteer legion.

The final area of the unorthodox war in Europe embraces the Western European nations. Western Europe is second only to the United States among the world centers of industrial production. There, we must continue to support the newly created and ever-growing United Europe movement. This is the bastion across the path of Soviet expansion. Its security is of major importance in strategic planning—both for what it gives to Western strength and what it could give to the strength of any hostile power which made it captive. Were this bastion to fall, it would enable the Soviets to come to the Atlantic; and the Atlantic, to the Soviet Air Force, would be port of entry to the United States.

The unification of Europe has proceeded along two lines. Beginning in early 1948, close cooperation in economic, political and military matters has developed among the majority of the Western European nations through inter-governmental organizations. Help was given by the European Movement—a volunteer organization of citizens of the various countries of Europe concerned—and by the encouragement and support of the American Committee on United Europe—a group of American citizens.

In addition, since 1950, a smaller "hard core" of European states—Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands——have advanced beyond cooperation and are establishing federal institutions having the power to make decisions for the common membership in specific economic, military and political fields.

The Schuman Plan is now a going concern, and provides for a rapid expansion of coal and steel production necessary to meet defense needs and an increasing standard of living.

In August, 1950—two months after the assault on Korea—the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe responded to a motion by Winston Churchill and endorsed a resolution calling for: ". . . . . the immediate creation under the authority of a Europ-

ean Minister of Defense of a European Army. . . . ." and on October 24, 1950, France came forward with the "Pleven Plan," which became the basis for negotiations that led to the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty in May, 1952.

On last March 10, after six months of work by the Assembly and its Constitutional Committee, the finished draft of a constitution was submitted to the six governments—France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. If approved by the foreign ministers of these countries, it will be placed before the national parliaments for ratification.

With every concrete step toward the union of Europe, the opposition from left and right-wing extremes becomes more intense and more determined. We must recognize, for instance, that the French-German dispute over th Saar and the strength of the Social Democrats in Western Germany can block the completion of the six-nation European Army project and the peace contract between the federal government and the Big Three Western Powers. France has made it plain that the Saar dispute must be settled before the National Assembly can be asked to ratify the E. D. C.

Were the parliaments of these two countries to refuse ratification, it would seriously delay the realization of a United Europe and greatly impair the prestige, the influence and the leadership of our own country.

Across the Atlantic, the European movement is seeking to rally public opinion. Now, more than ever, European leaders in this fight need the encouragement and support of free citizens everywhere.

On our part, we Americans must recognize that the center of gravity in the world has moved to the United States. Thus, history has forced upon us a position of leadership—a responsibility we are reluctant to accept.

We are a people that want to be liked. We forget that the search for popularity has led other men and other nations down many bitter paths. As we move deeper into this great struggle, our friendship will be questioned, our sincerity challenged, our integrity traduced and our power despised.

Our aim must be to abide by the truth as we know it, by our principles as we hold them, so that we shall deserve the confidence of other nations in the wisdom and dependability of our leadership.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Major General Donovan was born at Buffalo, New York, in 1883. He received degrees from Columbia University, Niagara University, University of Notre Dame, and Syracuse University. He began the practice of law at Buffalo in 1907, and served as counsel for New York State Fuel Administration. He was U. S. Attorney for the Western District of New York, and was Assistant Attorney General of the United States from 1924-25.

In World War I, he served as Captain of Troop 1, 1st Cavalry, New York National Guard; Assistant Chief of Staff, 27th Division, A. E. F., and became Colonel in command of the 165th Infantry Regiment (the old 69th, New York). This was the "Fighting 69th" of the famous Rainbow Division. During his army service he was wounded three times.

Major General Donovan was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with palm and silver star (France), and the Croci di Guerra (Italy).

He was unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy to Great Britain and southeastern Europe during 1940-41. He was appointed Coordinator of Information in 1941, and Director of Strategic Services in 1942—which position he held until the O. S. S. was disestablished in October, 1945. At present, he is practicing law and is a frequent speaker at the Naval War College.

GROUP SESSION

POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 May 1953 by
Dr. James P. Baxter

Admiral Conolly, members of the Naval War College and guests:

It is a great pleasure for me to return to the Naval War College where I have learned much over the years and made friendships I shall always cherish.

You have given me a lot of territory to cover this morning with the title: "Political Factors in the Formulation of National Strategy." I have been trying to think of what I might say that would not be too repetitive of what you have been reading and covering in your discussions, which are the life of this great institution. I am delighted to be asked to take part in a "global" problem, for it seems to me that it is only "global" thinking that will meet our national needs. They were well put for all nations, I think, in the remarks of the distinguished Chinese historian, who represents Chiang Kai-Shek's government in the United Nations, when Doctor Tsiang spoke in the General Assembly on September 22, 1949:

> ". . . . Today," he says, "from Iran on the Persian Gulf through Turkey, Greece and Italy to France and the Scandinavian north, the dike against the communist flood has been built and is now in good strong condition.
>
> But we know from experience that floods cannot be contained by building a dike on one side only. . . .
>
> Building the dike on one bank of the river has forced the waters to overflow the lands on the other bank. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact,

while strengthening the forces of freedom in one part of the world, have really, though unintentionally, increased the dangers to the peoples living in the other parts of the world."

The fact that we have to think globally makes the formulation of American foreign policy much harder and makes its description to the public much more complicated and difficult.

When I began teaching American diplomatic history at Harvard in 1927, it was a very different thing to describe than what it has become today. Looking back at my old outlines, they seem very thin, indeed, and the subject free of many of its most complex and difficult aspects.

George Kennan, writing in 1949, brought out this contrast:

"Long before World War II, it had been the European and Asiatic peoples—longer and better schooled for the struggle of survival in an atmosphere of deadly international rivalry—who had set on the dangerous marches between the two world—the Russian world and ours—and had borne the main responsibility for meeting the initial impact of the Soviet ambition. It was now the people of the United States of America who were called to shoulder this burden. They were a people unschooled and still inadept in the relation of military strength to national policy. They were unaccustomed to the sense of national insecurity. They were unprepared for the ordeal of sparring indefinitely and inconclusively with a force committed to the destruction not only of their own national power, but also of the sort of international context in which their ideals could be realized. Finally, they were reluctant to believe that there could be major international problems to which

there would not be incisive and final solutions if their policy-makers could only find them—problems, in other words, which had to be lived with instead of solved. It fell to these American people to acquire suddenly the art of being patient and conciliatory without showing weakness and, conversely, of maintaining strength and using it without being rash or provocative. These qualities, heretofore called for mainly from the rulers of great empires, had now to be elicited from the national understanding and feelings of a democratic republic and translated into action with a requisite promptness and discipline and subtlety through the unwieldy processes of democratic government."

We realize, of course, every time we pick up the morning paper—and today, perhaps, more vividly than most days—that it is essential to get American public understanding and support of strategy because the whole operation of our foreign policy and our military policy now intertwine. They have become so enormously expensive that without that support we can not get the requisite means from the Congress. It is a tremendous job to explain the need of these huge sums. We are going through a new phase now with the message of the President yesterday, requesting a total of $5,800,0000,000 for the Mutual Security Administration for the next year—a figure considerably higher than what many Congressmen would like to vote.

The preparation, therefore, of a democracy for shouldering loads like this is a problem on a different scale of magnitude, educationally, than anything which previous Presidents had to solve. It is fortunate, indeed, that our best newspapers do such a splendid job—both in the volume of news about foreign questions and about the armed services and in the quality of their comment. It is fine that we are able to have with us in a meeting like this such distinguished exponents of this art as Hanson Baldwin

and Gill Robb Wilson. On these gifted publicists, who are trying to burn away the fog in the American mind about strategic questions, there comes a very heavy responsibility. Fortunately, there are others who are not with us—like Mark Watson of the BALTIMORE SUN or S. L. A. Marshall of the Booth newspapers in Detroit—but the top group of military writers is too small; the number of papers that devote adequate space and high quality of reporting to strategic issues should be enlarged.

In the same way, it seems to me, we need more teachers in this country who have the kind of experience in grappling with international problems that you get here in the War College. There has been, of course, a tremendous change since the twenties and thirties. About half of my own faculty (and I imagine that is true of most college faculties) have served their country in uniform in World Wars I and II. Many others have served in civilian war agencies. They, of course, are much more alert to strategic questions and interests than they would have been if they had not been in the service. The revival of interest in military and naval history, which is one of the most striking aspects of the historical scene in America today, springs in part from the fact that so many historians had war experience. Instead of the rather sterile discussions of the thirties about the outlawing of force, there are some pretty fruitful discussions going on now about how you increase it and muster it in the ranks of the Free Nations in the hope of preventing a 'cold war' becoming a 'hot' one; or, at least, seeing to it that if the 'cold war' does becomes a 'hot' one, it is one that we and our allies are able to win. It would be a good thing if more teachers (like Doctor McGovern of your group) were able to have contacts, as a few of them do now, with this and other war colleges and go back refreshed, with their point of view shapened and stimulated, to spread the word among their colleagues.

Those of us who teach on the college and university front, should try to do more to put strategic material into our courses and to prevent them from becoming too conventional or stereo-

typed. The students in my course at Williams have just been reading a remarkable piece which illustrates, as well as any in recent years, strategic thinking at a high level which affected national policy. This was the testimony of Admiral Forrest Sherman before the Armed Forces Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in the MacArthur hearings on May 30, 1951. A few weeks earlier he had come here and delivered an admirable lecture at the Naval War College. And not long after his testimony came his tragic and premature death. All of us would do well to reread today his analysis of China's vulnerability to blockade and to attacks on her vital communications, and all of us should ponder his reasons for favoring a UN blockade of China and for disapproving of a unilateral blockade by the United States alone.

The more you study the relation of force to policy in American history, the more convinced you will become that a very large part of the job of informing and alerting public opinion has to be done by the President of the United States himself. For he is the man the public is always ready to listen to, whether it be in a Rooseveltian fireside chat, or in such a comprehensive review of our foreign policy as President Eisenhower made in the middle of April. Fortunate we are, indeed, that our strategic thinking is to be guided and shaped by a President with such vast experience in this field.

There is one aspect of the domestic side of our foreign policy problems that is not always brought up in a short talk but which seems to me should not be left out even in a 50-minute survey: that is the problem that we used to describe by the word "hyphenism." This problem arises from the fact that we have a lot of people in our body politic who think not only about the United States, their adopted country, but about another country to which they also have ties and attachments. There were about 5 million foreign-born in the United States in 1941, and they had a very large and varied foreign language press which many of them read

in preference to our English language press. The monitoring of that foreign language press was a pretty sizable job for the agency that did it—which happened to be the Defense Unit of the Department of Justice.

But "hyphenism" went further than that, for there were a lot of people of the second or third generation who had ties to foreign countries that distorted their thinking about American foreign policies. That, I suppose, will always continue. The isolationists argued in 1919-1920 that if we went into the League of Nations the United States would find that whatever stand we took on foreign questions would divide the American public along fault lines and cause splits in our national unity.

We later found that whether we liked it or not we had to reject isolationism and embark on a cooperative, internationalist policy. The fault lines are still present. There are too many people who think not merely as Americans but who regard some other country with a degree of affection that sometimes muddies their thinking. You can see it not merely in the small (and, I trust, dwindling) group of American communists and fellow travelers; you can see it in pro-Chinese groups in this country where the missionary influence (which got to work on many of us quite young) built up what tended at times to be an unrealistic picture of China. You can see it now in a pro-Polish group. You can see it—and see it perhaps as sharply as anywhere in its troublesome effect on global strategy—in the Zionist influence on American foreign policy. I'm not accepting the view that our concern for the Poles is merely because various people want to transfer a large Polish vote from one party to another. I don't share that feeling, though I would like to see my party strengthened—but I feel that it is a perfectly respectable attitude for anybody to wish that anybody under the Russian yoke can live a free life.

"Hyphenism" tends to produce a real split in public opinion, to divert us from our pursuit of national interest—which

seems to me the polestar by which we as a nation have to guide our course. You can find a clear illustration of it in the influence of Zionism on American diplomacy in the Middle East. There was no Arab vote in the United States. There was a high concentration of the Jewish vote in New York state, which both major parties wished to capture. As a result, the United States took a course—rightly or wrongly—which did seriously jeopardize our position in the Middle East, for there is no stronger hatred known to man, unfortunately, than the hatred of the Arab for the Jew. Though we don't have Arab voters, there are millions of Arabs and other Moslems in the Middle East whose support would be helpful to us in the event of a war with Russia in that theater.

I am not trying here to rewrite history, but to indicate a danger on the political front that we, who have drawn so much strength from the foreigners who have come and enriched our land and its culture, owe to our melting pot. Here, the proper line was laid down for us by a great representative of this country even before George Washington became President. I am referring to the famous episode when John Adams—that redoubtable, conservative evolutionist—presented his credentials to his former sovereign, George III. A tense moment it was in the history of the British Empire. They had lost the richest jewel from their Imperial crown, and here was a former rebel from Massachusetts presenting his credentials as the minister plenipotentiary of the new state. The King, with more bluntness than tact, said to Mr. Adams something that referred to the current belief that Mr. Adams had been pretty suspicious of the French during the peace negotiations of 1782-3.

Mr. Adams picked it up with equal bluntness and replied to the King: "I must avow to Your Majesty that I have no affection save for my own country."

The King, realizing that he had put his foot in it, rejoined: "An honest man will have no other."

It would be well if all Americans could remember that when they think on other lines than the polestar of American interests they are not following John Adams' example.

Some of our allies have "hyphenism" to deal with, too, in their large communist parties. Though the situation isn't as dangerous as it was in 1947-8, communist influence is a problem that they have to consider and that we have to consider. France has powerful nationalist movements to cope with in Tunisia and in Indochina. One of the strange dichotomies in American life since the period of World War II is the clash between our instinctive national sympathy with a nation struggling to be free and our underlying strategic interest which is affected by this nationalist movement in one of its colonies. I don't expect to take time in this brief survey to try to resolve this dilemma, but simply to remind you that in our approach to this problem we haven't done enough strategic thinking. We have done a lot of emotional sympathizing with people struggling to be free. Have we done enough realistic thinking about the impact of it on defense problems in certain crucial areas?

We have to bear in mind how we look to our allies and how we look to the neutrals. Some of the European neutrals are afraid that we will try to do too much. It is natural that some of them should feel that the danger is that we will do too little. There is that horrible skeleton in our cupboard of pulling out of Europe in 1920, which they never forget. It is highly unlikely that we shall do that again because to do so would be to give the game to Russia and to spell our ruin.

There are certain other aspects of our policy on which they are more sensitive than the possibility of a complete pullout. There is the fear that we might revert to a policy of hemisphere defense, which would be one version of a pull-out; or, that we would revert to the concept of serving only as the arsenal of democracy, which we did so much to popularize in 1940-1.

It is perfectly natural that the Europeans would dread a situation in which, in the event of Russian armies starting west, there would be nobody from the United States to stand with them in an attempt to resist on the ground. They feel very much about this possibility as the Poles must have felt about the situation in which they found themselves in September, 1939— and they don't like it! That is perfectly natural. And because we can understand why they don't like it and because we can understand the necessity of making a contribution not only by sea and air and munitions, but on the ground—we don't like it, either! We, as a result of a great debate that rocked the nation, have committed American troops to bulwark the defense of Europe, hoping that if we can make it strong enough, there will be no fighting.

Many Europeans quite naturally have in the bottom of their hearts the feeling that it would be wonderful if they could sit out the next war. How lovely it would be if their country could be the Switzerland of the next war! Before we blame them too much for that, we have to realize that a lot of us would like to sit out the next war, too. But we know that we can't, without putting ourselves in the position that, strategically, would constitute a major peril. If any of you should wish to contest this view, I suggest that you read carefully all that you can find of the Joint Chiefs' discussions between the Fall of France in 1940 and Pearl Harbor. For the impact on the United States of the situation where the Germans were dominating Western Europe could be repeated again. Once it was repeated—if the Russians and Germans should jointly dominate the European Continent—the Joint Chiefs of that day would have some terrible headaches, too. They would be too busy to look back to the history of 1940-1, when the Joint Chiefs were trying to use utterly inadequate means to cover an extraordinary wide front against a variety of major perils.

Just as there are some people in Europe who are afraid we are going to do too little (though I think we have reassured them pretty well on that score), there are many more who are afraid

that we are going to try too much. They dread that we are going to barge ahead on our own without the necessary patience, skill, or subtlety (of which Kennan spoke in that passage I quoted earlier). They fear that we will land them, as well as ourselves, in a war with Russia that might be an unnecessary war and, at least, would be (in their opinion) an untimely war. We have to be daily conscious of those fears and shape our diplomacy to take account of them.

If you examined the reaction in the delegates' lounge at the UN to the Eisenhower speech of April 16, you found that the minute the President got talking about Eastern Europe—hinting at the rollback concept—there was nervousness and apprehension on the part of many of the European and Asian delegates. This shows the thin ice on which we skate because of the fear of our allies and of all the neutrals that the United States, though talking a good game about a 'cold war' that will never become 'hot,' might really be planning to bring on the 'hot war' at an early date, after all. The Europeans wonder if we Americans will be patient enough with Russia. Not being the most patient of men myself, I find my temper getting short at times, as perhaps you do.

I discovered the other day an extraordinary quotation about Russia, written in 1930 by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to a man I never liked, Harold Laski:

> "The communists have killed so far as they could those who did not agree with them and want to kill the rest. They (the Russians) present a case where I fail to see that war is absurd. When two crowds determinately wish to make different kinds of a world, if they come in contact I don't see what there is to do but to fight."

I hadn't realized that Oliver Wendell Holmes was, even in his more relaxed moods, thinking about preventive war as far back

as 1930. One difficulty with that concept, of course, is that you couldn't sell it to the American people even if you should try.

Henry Stimson, in October of 1947, in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS said something that ought always to be remembered on this score:

> "An equal and opposite error is made by those who argue that Americans by strong-arm methods, perhaps even by a 'preventive war,' can and should rid the world of the Communist menace. I cannot believe that this view is widely held. For it is worse than nonsense; it results from a hopeless misunderstanding of the geographical and military situation, and a cynical incomprehension of what the people of the world will tolerate from *any* nation . . . . Americans as conquerors would be tragically miscast."

Despite that rejection (and I think that almost all the men in the services whom I know reject the concept of "preventive war"), the fear of it is one of the things that poisons our relations with our allies and that poisons our relations with the neutrals. We have to be pretty careful about our statements and put a guard on them on this score.

Another thing that we have done that has irritated our allies has been the extent to which we have pushed the idea of European integration. It is a very attractive idea—it is a very important idea. It may be true, as Paul Hoffman and John Foster Dulles have argued, that it is absolutely indispensable. But when you start pushing it, as we have done (on the invitation, of course, of many a European statesman who would like to move faster in that direction than he is able to), you do stir up old and deep-lying suspicions and resistances — and you get millions of Europeans into a defensive mood.

There was a delightful story a few years ago of a European diplomat who was being ticked off by a high American official for being lukewarm on the subject of European economic integration. He came back with a charge which has a certain measure of force in it—that we were rather "vague" about our formulation of the concept. He said that our American attitude reminded him of a story that he got from a friend of his who was a psychiatrist.

In this story a beautiful young lady told the psychiatrist about a dream she had had. In the dream, she heard a noise in her room, sat up in bed and saw a very handsome and virile-looking man advancing across the floor towards her in the moonlight.

She screamed out: "What are you going to do to me?"

And the man said to her: "You tell me, young lady—this is your dream, not mine."

It is certainly true that there are some European statesmen that do share our dream about European integration—but there are a lot who do not. When we push the idea, we do have to remember that it is our dream—not theirs.

Down to now, it seems to me, we have made extraordinary progress (considering the length of time we have had on it) in working out the NATO Alliance. What is troubling me now about it is this: To what extent has the progress we have made been due to the fact that the Russians, by maintaining a tough, irresponsible, reckless, and obscenely irritating course, have done the job for us of welding NATO together? However you may estimate that, you certainly have to give them a lot of credit for both the creation of NATO and the development of NATO.

General Donovan, whom we are going to have the privilege of hearing tomorrow, used to say to those of us who worked for him in 1941: "It would be a very good idea if, from time to time,

you put your hats on backwards and asked yourselves what you would do if you were running the show for the enemy." Obviously, we wouldn't have all the information that we needed, but the exercise might alert us to some aspects of the strategic problem that we might otherwise overlook.

I have done that, as you have probably done it, from time to time over the last year—and every time I did it I thought that, in view of the extraordinary importance to us of the evolution of NATO towards a stronger and more effective instrument, a grave danger would arise if the Russians decided that instead of stepping down on the loud pedal of their piano they step down on the soft pedal and cease to be so provocative and challenging. If they did that, would they produce within the NATO Alliance more serious cracks than have appeared to date? Would it be possible for the Russians, by a peace offensive, to weaken the opposition to their aggressive policies more effectively than they have hitherto? Then came a shift of policy in Russia—and I have been worrying about it more than ever, as, no doubt, you have.

That does not mean that one would not want a peace in which the Russians really made concessions of the kind that we must hope for, eventually, when we negotiate from strength. Maybe that time has come—we will have to see. But the danger to my way of thinking, is that they may simply be going through a phase designed to woo us and our allies by a false sense of security, to put a strain on our relations with our allies and with the neutrals. The Russians are experts in driving wedges to split and weaken the opposition.

My view of Russian policy is very much that taken by Ambassador Bullitt back in 1935, when he reported to the State Department, after having watched the Russians from the Embassy in Moscow for two years or more, that he didn't believe that there was any sign that the Russians had laid aside their ambition for world dominion; that what they were doing, in 1934-35 (when

they were early alarmed about the menace from Germany and Litvinov was operating in the front rank of the advocates of collective security) was simply going through a phase—an idea that recurs again and again in Russian ideological writing—going through a phase in which they were buying time by pretending to shelve their long-run aggressive policy.

There is no good evidence that we can muster that their peace moves ever amount to more than that—that they ever do more than go into a phase. On the other side of this phase there always remains their long-run objective of world domination. At present it is smart policy from their standpoint to play the piano for a while with the soft pedal down. For that reason, we have got to be singularly careful of these susceptibilities of our allies and neutrals and see to it that we maintain and strengthen our common front within the NATO Alliance.

At the same time, we must not be blind for a moment to the important opportunities that might present themselves to weaken the Soviets by doing a little wedge-driving ourselves, along the fault lines that divide the Russians from their satellites. We can't study too carefully the important split that took place when Yugoslavia was thrown out of the Soviet system. There is a very interesting and suggestive biography of Tito by a Serbo-Croat communist, Dedijer, which has been translated into English—an English which limps a little. This book is extremely revealing. All through it you will see something of enormous importance: that the Yugoslav communists are nationalists, too. Whatever communist ideology might dictate to them, they remain nationalists with that intense patriotic sentiment that enabled them to throw three invading Austrian armies out of their country in the first World War and made themselves tough to deal with by the Germans in World War II.

To an historian, that spells out an extraordinary parallel —the parallel of the French Revolution, where nationalism rode on

the banners of the armies of the French Republic for a while and for a while on the armies of the Empire. Sooner or later, French expansion provoked a kind of resistance that the French armies hadn't had before. They ran into it in Spain, they ran into it in Austria, and they ran into it in Russia. It seems to me that out of that kind of nationalist sentiment that you find ringing through the words of these Yugoslavs there comes a possibility of more splits between the Russians and their satellites. Abundant as are their means of repression, the Russians will run into trouble in Poland and in East Germany.

One of the things, of course, that interests us the most in this connection is the possibility of a split—eventually, at long last—between the Russians and Red China. It is a strange situation now that perhaps the most distinguished communist in the world—both as an operator and as a theoretician—is the Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung. His success constitutes a variant in communist ideology. I suggest to you two very interesting books on this, both published by the Russian Research Center at Harvard: one the book by Schwartz, *Mao Tse-tung and the Rise of Chinese Communism,* and the other the documentary volume that came out a year later (in 1952) to accompany it. You can see why for so long Mao was in the Soviet dog-house. He had presumed to run a revolution along lines that were not correct, according to Soviet ideology. He had made a successful revolution without having the leadership in the hands of the urban proletariat—and that just wasn't done in Soviet ideology.

To us Americans, who are pragmatists from the time we begin to take our first meal, ideology is of slight consequence—but it is not so to the Russians. They have spent a lot of time on problems like these and they take them really hard. Because of their concept that the government must be right they have to go through some extraordinary gyrations when the government changes the party line. This has been well described in Moore's book, *Soviet Politics: the Dilemma of Power*—one of the most

amusing and sophisticated accounts of how they change their minds when they get around to it, and pretend they never have really changed at all.

You have here an important fault line in Russo-Chinese relations. Of course, it was always absurd to refer to the Chinese Reds as agrarian reformers — for they were communists, root and branch, but they achieved their success by methods that were not right, according to Soviet ideology. That still probably plagues and bothers the Russians. Moreover, who can tell when in the evolution of Chinese communist expansion and Russian expansion there may be clashes of interest and resultant strains? A well-known Chinese historian has pointed out in this connection that by and large in Chinese history, when there was a change of dynasty, the dynasty consolidated power internally over a period of years before embarking on radical foreign ventures. The advent to power of Chinese communism is the equivalent of a new dynasty like the Mings or the Manchus. If the historic pattern repeats itself, one might expect a considerable period of domestic consolidation before an embarkation on any overseas expansion. Yet, you have Chinese armies now posted on the border of Indochina—a point of tremendous strategic significance.

As we look at the Indochinese problem, which is only a part of the French problem, we see almost in a microcosm the kind of strategic approach that we are faced with in Washington today. On the one hand, our French ally, like ourselves, has to do the tremendous difficult job (of which I spoke at the beginning of this talk) of educating its public to the heavy sacrifices required by an enormously expensive foreign policy. It is a difficult thing for the French to do because with the Gaullists opposing the government on the one hand and the communists on the other, the French Cabinet rests on only about 55% of the voting strength of the country. Though the Cabinets shift frequently, there is a continuity of personnel that belies the change at the head of the Ministry. But the French Government is even more dependent on

public opinion than is our own. If we ask them to do too much at any given moment, we may drive the standard of living of the French worker (which is already perilously low) below the point at which he becomes a push-over for communist propaganda.

The American public scarcely recognizes the magnitude of the French effort in Indo-China, or its cost in casualties as compared with the Korean operation, and its cost in money. The French have been spending one and one-third billion dollars a year in Indo-China and it has not been enough. Many Americans have asked why the French continue such staggering expenditures. There are a number of reasons but the one that concerns us Americans is the strategic factor. If Chinese communism is to expand southward over Southeastern Asia, there are only two main routes and both of them pass through Northern Indo-China. If Chinese communism extends southward it may do so without clashing with Russian expansion interests. If Chinese communism is blocked off from expanding to the south, there is much more chance of a split between Russia and China over their conflicting interests along their extended boundary in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang.

I think that the administration in Washington in its negotiations with the French, since the beginning of the new administration, has faced up to this strategic problem in a remarkable fashion. We know from the pressure in Laos how serious the situation is. The French need at least four more divisions there than they can afford to pay for. In the recent negotiations, we have agreed to increase our share of the cost to perhaps a third.

If we are to play our role of holding the fort while strength is built up within the NATO Alliance, we have to explain a highly expensive foreign aid program to an American public that has got weary of tax-paying. That we shall succeed in doing so, I am confident. For, no matter how ignorant certain elements of the American public may be of the finer points of strategy that you dis-

cuss here, something happened under President Roosevelt's enlightened leadership in 1940-41. The American public—which had done all too much thinking from 1933 to 1937 about staying out of international affairs at all costs—had realized before it was too late that our security required of us a new concern in the balance of power; and that our security made it impossible for us to tolerate the domination of Europe or the domination of Asia, either, by powers who could, upon that domination, build a threat that would have us fighting on our hearthstone with insufficient strength.

Something happened back there in 1940-41 and the American public deeply learned a lesson. They don't know as much about strategy as you, but I believe from the bottom of my heart that they are prepared to pay the price when the need for it is spelled out to them by such competent leadership as now is ours.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Baxter was born in Portland, Maine, 15 February 1893. He attended Williams College, receiving an A. B. degree in 1914 and an A. M. in 1921. In 1923, he received an A. M. degree from Harvard and a Ph.D. from the same institution in 1926. Honorary degrees have been bestowed upon him by Harvard, Amherst, University of Maine, Wesleyan University, Hobart College, Bowdoin, Syracuse, Case Institute of Technology, Kenyon College and Union College.

From 1914-1915, Dr. Baxter was with the Industrial Finance Corporation in New York City. In 1921-22, he was an instructor in history at Colorado College and was a traveling fellow at Harvard in 1924-25. From 1927-37, he taught history at Harvard—climbing from instructor through the ranks to full professorship. He was master of Adams House from 1931-37. Since 1937, he has served as President of Williams College.

Dr. Baxter was a lecturer at Lowell Institute, Boston, in 1931, and at Cambridge University in 1936. He has lectured at the Naval War College periodically since 1932. From August, 1941 to June, 1942, he was Director of Research and Analysis for the Coordinator of Information in Washington, D. C., and from

June, 1942-43, he was Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services. From 1943-46, he served as Historian in the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

In 1945, Dr. Baxter was President of the Association of American Colleges. He has served as a trustee for Williams, Radcliffe, the World Peace Foundation, Phillips Academy and the American Military Institute. In 1947, he was winner of the Pulitzer prize in history. He is also a director of the State Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Dr. Baxter is the author of several books and is a contributor to history and law journals. He is a member of numerous professional organizations, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Association.

GROUP SESSION

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD STRUGGLE

Remarks delivered
at the Naval War College
during the Plenary Session
Global Strategy Discussions
8 May 1953 by
Mr. George W. Wolf,
President, U. S. Steel Export Company

Gentlemen:

As I listened this morning, I felt very much like that beautiful blond Dr. Baxter told you about. I couldn't help thinking and wondering who was dreaming. I think we ran the gamut of all the human emotions this morning and I am going to touch on some of those human emotions—unfortunately, much more lightly than I would like to.

Since my subject is "economics," I want to say that it is my sincere, earnest and conscientious conviction that our refuge and our strength, in the world crisis that faces us as individuals and as a nation, is our economic strength—our economic potential. I wonder how many of you have thought deeply on how we got so economically strong that we are the wonder, the envy and—to Russia—the despair of the world, economically speaking.

I am firmly convinced that the economic health or strength and the economic well-being of any nation, any territory or any group of nations, depends on relatively few, simple and (to me) self-evident facts. In the case of our country, certainly it is a truism that our economic health and well-being is due to and dependent upon *raw materials* to which we have had—thank God, thanks to the British Navy up to now, and perhaps in the future thanks to the United States Navy—access to raw materials wherever we find them; that is, those that we haven't within our own borders.

The next thing after raw materials in the formula for economic health and well-being, or economic strength, is *manpower.* We have a great reservoir of ingenious, able and capable manpower.

The next is *tools.* The American has been famous ever since we became a nation for ingenuity in making tools.

So, we have the elements: manpower, raw materials and tools. If we add all those together and multiply their sum total by the coordinating factor of *efficiency*—the efficiency with which we use the tools—the result is, and has been, the great economic potential of the United States. When we talk about the efficiency with which we use raw materials, tools, and manpower, we get into the economic, social, political and spiritual atmosphere in which those three things are coordinated and which I call "the great multiplier." Fortunately, we have had a beneficent atmosphere in which those three elements can work and which have resulted in our economic strength. That, I say, is our greatest refuge and strength in the crisis that confronts us as individuals and as a nation.

When I say the most important of all those factors is the great multiplier or the atmosphere in which those three things work together and are coordinated I, naturally, refer to the tradition of individual enterprise to which, I think, alone is due the miracle of production of the United States. I wonder how many of you have ever thought deeply and have tried to define just what "free, individual enterprise" is. In the short time at my disposal, I would like to give you a very brief definition of what, in my opinion, American free enterprise consists. So that you don't think this is the work of my own thought, I want to say that the definition I am about to give is, in substance, what the American delegates to the International Business Conference in Rye, New York, subscribed to in 1944, at which time there were some 129 representatives of some 129 nations assembled and at which time the American delegation thought it very important that we, as Americans, state what we believed to be the enterprise system

of America in order to clear up any doubts in the minds of those from all over the world, many of whose thoughts were contaminated by the growing spirit of nationalism.

We Americans said this—that free individual enterprise was the right (and, gentlemen, I say "right") of the individual by himself or in concert with others to set up in business for himself; to own, to use and to risk the mechanical means of production. We said that the reward for success in such an undertaking was *profit,* and the penalty of failure was the loss of what had been ventured. We opined that nothing other than this could provide the incentive upon which economic progress is built. We went on to say that the processes of research, discovery, expiration, invention and experiment were all characteristic of the free individual enterprise system. Then we said that without the right of the individual to venture his capital, where profit seemed likely, to seek his living where he could find it—without these we thought (and I still think) it is pure delusion to imagine that political and social freedom—even if they existed—could long endure.

We discussed at length in our group here what to me is a very interesting subject: What is This World Struggle All About? In my opinion, I sincerely, conscientiously, and with all the force of my soul and character believe that when you strip the question of everything except stark reality—we are fighting to preserve our individual liberties or our American way of life. If we don't gain that in the struggle—then perhaps we might be in a position of the man referred to in the Bible, "when we have gained the whole world and lost our own souls."

People refer to the "American way of life" often these days. I would like to say what I think is the "American way of life" which, I hope, we are fighting to preserve. Because if we are not fighting to preserve that, then quite frankly I, personally, have no interest in the struggle.

What then is this "American way of life" that I believe we are fighting to preserve for our children and our children's children? Fundamentally, to me, that American way of life is a system of living, a system of ethics, a system of treatment one toward the other handed down through the centuries of the Christian era by men and women who practice in their daily lives the love and the fear of God.

Fundamentally, to me, it is realization that man was created in the image and likeness of God; that man is a spiritual being, not a materialistic one; and that the individual value and worth of a human heart and soul are worth fighting for, lest the human race revert again to the bondage of resurgent and cynical mob tyranny.

This idea of life, I believe, found divine expression and inspired interpretation in our Constitution and our Bill of Rights. These documents have been hailed the world over by men and women of goodwill as Magna Cartas in the cause of human freedom. Part and parcel of this human freedom is economic freedom. I touched on that in my definition of "free enterprise." But I would like to say this: as long ago as 1759, Benjamin Franklin said: "He that would give up an essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserves neither liberty nor safety."

Our determination to live up to this American heritage, this American tradition, must ever be unflagging, unfailing. If it should not be, then reversion to slavery will become but a matter of time, as the unhappy residents of Russia and her satellites very tragically know.

Today, the forces of evil are everywhere around us. There are those who say that the American economic system, which they loosely refer to as "the Capitalistic system," is simply an economic system whereby the Capitalists enslave the masses. These saboteurs of our American way do not appreciate, even if they un-

derstand, the total and unique lack of similarity between our American economic system (call it what you want) and any other economic system past or present in the entire human experience. There is as much similarity between our so-called "American capitalistic system" and the so-called "capitalistic systems" of any other country in the world as there is between a rabbit and a horse.

In America, it is the people who own American enterprise and every American, regardless of race, color or creed, may become the owner through purchase of as much or as little of any enterprise he chooses. American management is a steward for the stockholders, the owners, the people—and American management produces or the owners change it. This peculiarly American system has produced in our short life as a nation, and actually in the last forty years, more goods and services—and has distributed those goods and services to more people in greater abundance—than was produced, or has been produced, in all the centuries of human effort since Adam and Eve.

I say, gentlemen, therefore, let's not be beguiled by those who would beguile us to destroy us. Let us guard well and devotedly nurture the fundamental freedoms of our American heritage that have made this country strong and great, and without which we will fall prey to the enemy that confronts us. Let us realize, I implore you, that this priceless heritage of American freedom cannot be willed nor can it be inherited. It must be fought for and defended by each succeeding generation.

Remembering this, let us rededicate ourselves to our sacred obligation to pass this heritage on to those who are to come after, unsullied and better than we found it.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Mr. Wolf was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on April 15, 1892. He graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1913, after which he did graduate work at Lehigh University.

He remained in the Navy until 1926, advancing from Ensign to Lieutenant Commander. Mr. Wolf was awarded the Navy Cross as a result of combat action in World War I.

In 1926, he resigned from the Navy to begin a civilian career with the General Motors Overseas Operations Company, becoming Managing Director in the countries of Argentine, Poland, Germany and Spain from 1926-38.

In 1939, Mr. Wolf became President of the U. S. Steel Export Company, New York City—a position which he now holds. In addition, he is a member of the Executive Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

His clubs are The Army and Navy Club of Washington and The Metropolitan Club of New York.



Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Officer Participants in the Fifth Annual Session Global Strategy Discussions at the U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

LIST OF VISITING PARTICIPANTS

Civilians

Name	Business or Occuation and Place of Business
ARMSTRONG, Paul S.	Sunkist Growers San Gabriel, California
BALDWIN, Hanson W.	Military Editor New York Times
BAXTER, James P., III, Dr.	President Williams College Williamstown, Massachusetts
BENNETT, Charles D.	Special Consultant Foundation for American Agriculture 1731 Eye Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.
BLACKETT, Donald W., Dr.	Member, Analytical Research Group Forrestal Research Center Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
BROWN, Sevellon, III	Editor Providence Journal-Bulletin Providence, Rhode Island
CALLERY, Francis A.	Associated with Lehman Bros. New York City, New York
CARSTENSEN, Henry	Master Washington State Grange 3104 Western Avenue Seattle 1, Washington
CHUBB, Percy, II	Partner Chubb & Son 90 John Street New York City, New York
COLEMAN, John A.	Chairman of Board of Directors Stock Clearing Corporation 15 Broad Street New York City, New York

Name	Business or Occuation and Place of Business
DAVIES, Richard L.	President Pennsalt International Corp. Widener Building Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
DILLON, Gerald F., Rev.	President Salve Regina College Newport, Rhode Island
DONOVAN, William J., Maj. Gen., U. S. A. (Ret.)	Law Partner Donovan, Leisure, Newton, Lumbard & Irvine 2 Wall Street New York City, New York
EWING, J. Franklin, Dr.	Assistant Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Office of Research Services Fordham University New York City, New York
FELT, Irving	Chairman of the Executive Committee Graham-Paige Corporation 40 Wall Street New York City, New York
FOX, William T. R., Professor	Professor, Department of Government Columbia University New York City, New York
FRAZER, Joseph W.	Automobile Manufacturer 40 Wall Street New York City, New York
GARMAN, W. O. H., Reverend	Vice President and Chairman Commission on Chaplains The American Council of Christian Churches 1919 Beech Street Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania
GOLDSTEIN, Louis, Judge	County Judge; Chairman, Board of Judges, Kings County 50 Plaza Street Brooklyn, New York

Name	Business or Occuation and Place of Business
GORDON, Mortimor S.	Senior Partner Gordon, Brady, Caffrey & Keller, Attorneys 20 Pine Street New York City, New York
GOUGH, Lewis K.	National Commander The American Legion 1608 K Street, N. W. Washington 6, D. C.
HARDING, Carroll R.	President The Pullman Company Merchandise Mart Plaza Chicago, Illinois
HECHT, Frank A.	National President Navy League of the United States 1250 West Van Buren Street Chicago 7, Illinois
HORNE, Charles F., RAdm., U. S. N. (Ret.)	Consultant in Aviation and Electronics Alexandria, Virginia
HUHN, John B.	Partner Bache & Company 40 Wall Street New York City, New York
JEMAIL, Emil E.	Associato Editor Newport Daily News Newport, Rhode Island
JUDGE, Cyril B., Capt., U. S. N. (Ret.)	Writer "Sulthorne" Webster Street Newport, Rhode Island
KENNEY, W. John	Attorney-at-Law 804 Ring Building Washington 6, D. C.
KIRK, Alan G., Adm., U. S. N. (Ret.)	Psychological Strategy Board 1320 29th Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.
KLINE, Allan B.	President American Farm Bureau Federation 221 North La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
KNIGHT, John S., Dr.	Assistant Professor, School of Medicine University of Kansas Kansas City, Missouri
KRIENDLER, Maxwell A.	Club "21" 21 W. 52nd Street New York City, New York
LUCKENBACH, Edgar F., Jr.	President Luckenbach Steamship Lines New York City, New York
MACKIE, Donald M.	Executive Commonwealth Services, Inc. 20 Pine Street New York City, New York
MADDEN, James L.	Vice President Metropolitan Life Insurance Company New York City, New York
MANCHESTER, Alan K., Dr.	Dean of Undergraduate Studies; Professor of History Duke University Durham, North Carolina
MARK, Julius, Dr.	Senior Rabbi Congregation Emanu-El One East 65th Street New York City, New York
MASLAND, John W., Professor	Professor, Department of Government Dartmouth University Hanover, New Hampshire
McLEOD, Lamar W.	Vice President Westinghouse Electric Corp. St. Louis, Missouri
McMILLEN, Wheeler	Editor Farm Journal Washington Square Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
MOORE, Charles J., RAdm., U. S. N. (Ret.)	Brookings Institution 722 Jackson Place, N. W. Washington 6, D. C.

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
MORAN, Edmond J.	President Moran Towing and Transportation Company 17 Battery Place New York City, New York
MORELAND, Harry	President Great Lakes Pipe Line Company Bryant Building Kansas City, Missouri
PICKARD, Burt W.	Assistant General Sales Manager Standard Oil Company of California 225 Bush Street San Francisco, California
PINCKARD, William H.	President California-Texas Oil Co., Ltd. 551 Fifth Avenue New York City, New York
RAMSEY, Hobart C.	President Worthington Pump and Machinery Company 401 Worthington Avenue Harrison, New Jersey
REEVES, John W., Jr., Adm., U. S. N. (Ret.)	Retired Pensacola, Florida
RICHARDS, Ernest V., Jr.	National Vice President Navy League of the United States 608 Canal Street New Orleans, Louisiana
ROOS, Charles F., Dr.	President Econometric Institution 230 Park Avenue New York City, New York
SEIBERLING, James P.	President and Chairman Seiberling Rubber Company Akron, Ohio
SMITH, Rex W. D., Jr.	Vice President, Public Relations American Airlines, Inc. 100 Park Avenue New York City, New York

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
SPRAGUE, Robert C.	Chairman of Board Sprague Electric Company 189 Beaver Street North Adams, Massachusetts
STEINHARDT, Jacinto, Dr.	Director, Operations Evaluation Group Office of Chief of Naval Operations Department of the Navy Washington, D. C.
TURNER, Gordon B.	Professor, Department of History Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
WALLER, J. V.	Motion Picture Industry Washington, D. C.
WEEKS, Edward	Editor Atlantic Monthly 8 Arlington Street Boston, Massachusetts
WHITING, L. H., Brig. Gen. U. S. A (Ret.)	President American Furniture Mart Chicago, Illinois
WILKINS, Raymond S.	Justice Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Court House Boston, Massachusetts
WOLF, George	President U. S. Steel Export Company 30 Church Street New York City, New York
WOLFE, Paul, Rov., D. D.	Minister Brick Presbyterian Church New York City, New York
YOUNG, Edwin P., Jr.	City Editor Baltimore Sun Baltimore, Maryland

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE OFFICERS

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
ACHENBACH, Clair F., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Insurance Practice and Law Practice Dallas, Texas
ADAMS, Charles F., Captain, U. S. N. R.	President Raytheon Manufacturing Company Waltham, Massachusetts
ADAMS, Charles S., Jr., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Bond Underwriter and Assistant Director of Personnel U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Ruxton 4, Maryland
ANDERSON, James R., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Sales Engineer Birmingham 9, Alabama
BARNUM, Robert H., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Assistant to President U. S. Steel Corporation New York City, New York
BENSON, Charles J., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Member, State Collection Agency Board, California San Francisco, California
BERGEN, John J., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Investment Banker New York City, New York
BEYER, Malcolm K., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Executive Officer and Director Iron Gate Products Co., Inc.; Fedelis Trading Co., Ltd.; Fedelis Fisheries, Ltd. Port Washington, New York
BLATCHFORD, Walter L., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Private Practice of Law Houston, Texas
BROWN, Harold F., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Aviation Consultant; Owner of Brown Company Aviation Insurance Burbank, California
BURDICK, Eugene L., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.	Assistant to the Chancellor University of California Berkeley, California
CLUSMAN, Elmer C., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Partner T. Henry Clusman Company (Grain Millers and Feed Formulations) Brooklandville, Maryland

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
CUSHING, Howard G., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Investment Banker (Retired, 1948) Newport, Rhode Island
DANCEY, Charles L., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Editorial Writer and Commentator Springfield, Illinois
DE KIEFFER, Eugene, Commander, U. S. N. R.	Assistant Vice President First National Bank Dallas, Texas
DE LONG, Edmund S., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Director, Public Relations Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
DE LONG, W. F., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Petroleum Marketing Esso Standard Oil Company of New York New York City, New York
DE WOLF, Edwin A., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Sales Promotion Manager Hershey Chocolate Corporation Hershey Pennsylvania
DUBERG, H. P. J., Commander, U. S. N. R.	The Bridgeport City Trust Co. Bridgeport, Connecticut
DUGAN, James J., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Partner Dugan Manufacturing Company Quincy, Massachusetts
FARLEY, Louis C., Jr., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Brown Brothers; Harriman & Company; Assistant Manager, Boston Office, Commercial Banking, Domestic and Foreign Trade Boston, Massachusetts
FAY, Bertrand T., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	President Fay Advertising Agency Albany, New York
FONDAHL, John E., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Director Civil Defense for District of Columbia Washington, D. C.
FULMER, J. A., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Vice President of a Machine Tool Company Fort Thomas, Kentucky

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
GARRISON, James A., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Head of Logistical Office U. S. Government Agency Washington, D. C.
GIFFORD, Brooks, Captain, U. S. N. R.	Attorney Pasadena, California
GILMARTIN, Maurice A., Jr., Commander, U. S. N. R.	General Partner Charles E. Quincy & Company New York City, New York
GOLINKIN, Joseph W., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Staff Commandant, Fourth Naval District, U. S. Naval Base Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
HANSON, Arthur B., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Attorney-at-Law Chevy Chase, Maryland
HARRISON, W. H., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Crescent Commercial Company New Orleans, Louisiana (Dealers in Raw Furs)
HART, Robert W., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Electronics Scientist Office of Naval Research Boston, Massachusetts
HOLDEN, Edward, Captain, U. S. N. R.	Vice President U. S. Protection and Indemnity Agency, Inc. Manhasset, Long Island, N. Y.
HOLLOWAY, Jefferson D., Jr., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Home Mortgage New Orleans, Louisiana
HUNT, Emerson W., Captain, U. S. N. R.	General Information Manager New England Telephone and Telegraph Company Cambridge, Massachusetts
JARDINE, Douglas, Commander, U. S. N. R.	Construction Engineer Colorado Springs, Colorado
KALES, Robert G., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Kales-Kramer Investment Co. Detroit, Michigan
KELL, Walter M., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Superintendent York Wire & Cable Works General Electric Company Wrightsville, Pennsylvania

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
KIDD, George, Commander, U. S. N. R.	Foreign Section of Office of Naval Intelligence Washington, D. C.
KING, Harold G., Captain (MC), U. S. N. R.	Physician Seattle, Washington
KLAUS, Arnold J., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Economist San Diego, California
KNOWLAN, Joseph R., Brigadier General, U. S. M. C. R.	Senior Partner Knowlan, Thorpe & Company Havertown, Pennsylvania
KNOWLTON, Elliott B., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Public Relations Manager Norton Company Holden, Massachusetts
KRIENDLER, I. Robert, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Executive Jack and Charlie's "21" New York City, New York
LAMB, George G., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Professor, Chemical Engineering Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois
LAMBERT, Robert S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.	Rector Calvary Church, Clifton Cincinnati, Ohio
LATHAM, Henry, J., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.	Attorney-at-Law Brooklyn, New York
LYON, Harry N., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company Piedmont, California
MALLORY, Walter S., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Manufacturer, Concrete Products Roseburg, Oregon
McCAHILL, Eugene P., Commander, U. S. N. R.	President McCahill & Company, Inc. (Investment Securities) Minneapolis, Minnesota
McCORMICK, Gooderham L., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Sales Manager Allen, Lane & Scott Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
McMATH, Sidney S., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Attorney-at-Law Sheridan, Arkansas

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
MEACHAM, Ellis K., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Attorney Cantrell, Meacham & Moon & Meacham & Meacham Chattanooga, Tennessee
MEAD, States M., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Cresap, McCormick and Paget New York and Chicago (Management engineering firm)
MEEK, Raymond E., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Surgeon New York Eye and Ear Infirmary New York City, New York
PENNY, Richard J., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Manager Chi-Safway Steel Products-Scaffold Evanston, Illinois
PREVOST, George M., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Patent Lawyer Washington, D. C.
READ, William A., Commodore, U. S. N. R.	Vice President The Hanover Bank Purchase, New York
RICHARDSON, Edgar R., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Real Estate, Insurance and Building Richmond, Virginia
ROOSEVELT, James, Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	President Roosevelt and Sargent, Inc. Los Angeles, California
RYBERG, Milton E., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Technologist U. S. Forest Service Madison, Wisconsin
SADLER, William P., Captain (MC), U. S. N. R.	Physician Minneapolis, Minnesota
SCHIEFFELIN, John J., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Director of Training Chubb & Son New York City, New York
SCHMIDT, Arthur A., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Executive Vice President and General Manager Public Relations Management Corporation New York City, New York

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
SCOTT, Hoyt S., Captain, U. S. N. R.	District Engineer General Electric Company Cleveland, Ohio
SEARLES, Robert L., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Grain Futures Trader and Broker Minneapolis Grain Exchange Minneapolis, Minnesota
SHEARS, Curtis C., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Staff Officer, Command Center Office of Civil Defense Washington, D. C.
SINGER, Samuel J., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Lawyer-Partner Singer & Berling New York City, New York
SMITH, Curtis E., Jr., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Senior Partner Coffee Roasting Plant Augusta, Georgia
SMITH, Melvin M., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Manufacturer, Pres-to-logs Spokane, Washington
SMITH, William C., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Manager, Fuel Oil Shell Oil Company Indianapolis, Indiana
SPEER, Ross B., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Superintendent of Schools Redlands, California
STEDMAN, Giles C., Rear Admiral, U. S. N. R.	Vice President United States Lines Company New York City, New York
STEEL, Francis P., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Executive of a Security Holding Corporation Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
STEVENS, Royal B., Captain, U. S. N. R.	District Manager Wilson Lines, Inc. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
STONE, Hurford E., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Dean of Students University of California Berkeley, California
STRONG, Philip G., Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.
STURGEON, Robert D., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C. R.	Assistant Vice President Albert M. Greenfield & Co. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Name	Business or Occupation and Place of Business
SULLIVAN, J. Joseph, Commander, U. S. N. R.	Attorney San Francisco, California
VORIPAIEFF, Alexander, Commander, U. S. N. R.	Manager, Marine Department A. M. Byers Company New York City, New York
WEEKS, Paul R., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Physician 520 Republic Building Denver, Colorado
WESTPHAL, Norman E., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Plant Manager Weil McLain Company Long Beach, Michigan City, Indiana
WETMORE, Sherman B., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Bar Pilot for Ports of Galveston and Texas City, Texas Galveston, Texas
WILKINS, Walter L., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Professor of Psychology and Director of Department of Psychology St. Louis University St. Louis, Missouri
WILSON, Robert F., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Manager, Coolidge Laboratory General Electric Company Milwaukee, Wisconsin
WINN, John, Commander, U. S. N. R.	General Engineer South Carolina Electric and Gas Company West Columbia, South Carolina
ZITZEWITZ, Elmer K., Captain, U. S. N. R.	Manufacturer's Representative Johnson & Zitzewitz Evanston, Illinois

REPRESENTATIVES OF SERVICE SCHOOLS and SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

Name	Service School or Service Organization
BOUNDY, C. M., Captain (SC), U. S. N.	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
CAMPBELL, R. L., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Deputy Director Joint Staff for Logistics, JCS
DAY, E. M., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
DE BLANC, E. C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
FAHRION, F. G., Vice Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
FOLEY, R. J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. WISCONSIN
GARGIULO, E. A. H., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
GOOD, G. F., Major General, U. S. M. C.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
HARTMAN, C. C., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet
HEDERMAN, T. H., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island
HILLENKOETTER, R. H., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commandant, THIRD Naval District
JOHNSTON, P. F., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. POCONO
LAUTARET, J. D., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
LAWSON, R. H., Colonel, U. S. A.	Army War College
MARZETTA, D. R., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
McLINTOCK, George G., Commander, U. S. N. R.	Superintendent, U. S. Merchant Marine Academy
MOSS, C. D., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
NIENSTEDT, D. A., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet

Name	Service School or Service Organization
NORTON, L. N., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	National War College
OLDFIELD, J. S., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
RICE, G. M., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
RYDER, H. S., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
SANDERS, R. F., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
SCHWARTZ, I. J., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
SENN, C. C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
TAYLOR, J. McN., Captain, U. S. N.	Chief of Staff, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
THOMAS, G. C., Lieutenant General, U. S. M. C.	Assistant Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps
THOMSON, J. W., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WISCONSIN
WALLACE, R. W., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet
WOOD, C. C., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Deputy Commandant, National War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS AND STAFF

Name	Next Duty Assignment
ADAIR, Winston L., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
ADAMS, David G., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia
ALBERTSON, Walter E., Doctor	Remaining on Staff, War College, as Scientific Adviser
ALLENDORFER, Harry C., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
AMME, Robert G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California
AUGENBLICK, Richard C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
BACHHUBER, Joseph A., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina
BAILEY, Charles J. Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia
BAILEY, Joslyn R., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BALIS, Theodore L., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
BARDWELL, Charles L., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron FIFTY-SIX
BARNES, Stanley M., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BARNUM, M. Alice, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BARRETT, Alcus E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CHOPPER (SS-342)
BARRY, Walter J., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BATES, Richard W., Commodore, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
BEAKLEY, Wallace M., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	Commander, Middle East Force
BEAR, John H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.
BEAUCHAMP, Ernest M , Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training, Corpus Christi, Texas
BECTON, Frederick J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. GLYNN (APA-239)
BELCHER, Roy S., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval Air Technical Training Unit, Naval Air Station, Olathe, Kansas
BELLIS, Louis J., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BENTLEY, James C., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BERGLUND, Arnold A., Lieutenant Colonel, (TC) U. S. A.	New York Port of Embarkation, Brooklyn, New York
BERKELEY, James P., Colonel, U.S.M.C.	Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, 8th and I Streets, S. E., Washington, D. C.
BIERI, Bernhard H., Jr., Commander, (SC), U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
BLACKBURN, John T., Captain, U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
BLAIR, Jerome E., II, Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Far East Air Force
BOGART, Gerard S., Commander, U. S. N.	Executive Officer, U.S.S. POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
BOSBYSHELL, John H., Colonel, U. S. A.	9130th Technical Service Unit, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, 2800 South 20th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
BOSS, Jo Elaine, Ensign, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BOWEN, John R., II, Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training, Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas

Name	Next Duty Assignment
BOWKER, Albert H., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BOYD, Alfred I., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
BRADSHAW, Harold G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
BRANTLEY, William L., Major, U. S. A. F.	Advanced Flying School (Medium Bomber, Conventional), 3510th Fleet Training Wing Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
BRAZIL, Fredrick J., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, for temporary duty, and for further assignment on board a vessel
BREWER, William F., Commander, U.S.N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
BRIDGES, Dewey R., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	63d Troop Carrier Wing, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma
BRINGLE, William F., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. HORNET (CVA-12) (when placed in commission)
BRINK, John D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Cruiser Division THREE
BRITNER, George F., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. PRITCHETT (DD-561)
BROWN, James H., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Escort Destroyer Division SIXTY-TWO
BROWN, Percy H., Colonel (Armor), U. S. A.	2123th-2 Administrative Service Unit, Ft. Knox, Kentucky
BURCH, Charles A., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, for duy as a prospective commanding officer
BURNETTE, Oliver S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, Anacostia, Washington, D. C.
CALDWELL, Henry H., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
CAMPBELL, Clifford M., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

Name	Next Duty Assignment
CAMPBELL, Norwood A., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BLOCK ISLAND (CVE-106)
CANEY, Lawrence D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. RAYMOND (DE-341)
CANTY, Joseph P., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CASCADE (AD-16)
CARLSON, Daniel, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Blockading and Escort Force, Pacific Fleet
CARLSON, Edward B., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
CARTER, Robert R., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commanding Officer, Surface Anti-Submarine Development Detachment, Atlantic Fleet, Key West Florida
CAUFIELD, Cecil T., Captain, U S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWENTY
CHASE, Charles H., Colonel, U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Far East
CHEATHAM, Benjamin B., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
CLAINOS, Peter D., Colonel (Inf), U. S. A.	2112th Administrative Service Unit, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for duty with staff and faculty
COLE, Howard, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
COLE, J. Frank, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
COLLINS, William M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Far East
COMBS, Walter V., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Escort Squadron ELEVEN
CONOLLY, Richard L., Vice Admiral, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
COOPER, Charles T., III, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. TUSK (SS-426)

Name	Next Duty Assignment
COOPER, Robert W., Captain, U. S. N.	Advanced Study, Strategy and Sea Power, Naval War College
COSTELLO, Maurice J., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
COXE, Alexander B., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Destroyer Flotilla FOUR
CRAFT, James P., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
CRESAP, James B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CUCCIAS, Francis P., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. WASP (CVA-18)
CULVER, Paul D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California
DAUNIS, Stanley S., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
DAVIS, John B., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, SIXTH Fleet
DAVIS, Royce P., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
DAY, Robert S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. MILLER (DD-535)
DAYHUFF, Charles H., Jr., Colonel, (Armor), U. S. A.	Imperial Defense College, London, England
DENNISON, Junius W., Jr., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
DEWITT, Ralph B., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.
DICKEY, Joseph L., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.
DINGFELDER, Frank A., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
DISQUE, Robert M., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet (as prospective Commanding Officer of a Fighter or Attack Squadron) Naval Air Station, San Diego, California

Name	Next Duty Assignment
DISSETTE, Edward F., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Mine Squadron EIGHT
DODSON, Bennett M., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PLATTE (AO-24)
DONALDSON, James C., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia
DORSETT, John O. F., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
DOUGAN, Ramon C., Lieutenant Colonel, (Art.), U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Europe, Bremerhaven, Germany
DRESS, George K., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
DROPP, Anthony H., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Submarine Squadron TWELVE
DUPRE, Marcy M., III, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet (for duty as prospective Commanding Officer of a Fighter or Attack Squadron) Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
DURIO, Jack N., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
DURYEA, Harold E., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BRYCE CANYON (AD-36)
EARNEST, Albert K., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.
EDGAR, Donald, Mr., Foreign Service Officer, Department of State	American Consul General Alexandria, Egypt
ELWOOD, Hugh M., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia
EVANS, William T., Colonel (Inf), U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Far East, Yokohama, Japan
FAIRBOURN, William T., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Naval War College
FAIRFAX, Eugene G., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
FARGO, Lynn D., Lieutenant Colonel, (Inf), U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Far East, Yokohama, Japan
FERGUSON, C. Vaughan, Jr., Mr.	Department of State, Washington, D. C.
FIALA, Reid P., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BOTTINEAU (APA-235)
FITZGERALD, John N., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
FLETTER, Randolph W., Colonel (Art), U. S. A.	U. S.-Canada Interchange Officers Group, c/o U. S. Army Military Attache, Ottawa, Canada
FLY, William E., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
FOLEY, Francis D., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
FORD, George E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Carrier Division TWO
FORREST, Gaylord T., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Technical Training, Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tennessee
FOSTER, Thomas E., Jr., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Washington, D. C.
FRAZIER, Claude R., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, Pensacola, Florida
GALLAHER, Antone R., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Submarine Development Group TWO
GALLERY, Philip D., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PITTSBURGH (CA-72)
GANNON, Henry T., Commander (MC), U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
GARRETT, John H., Jr., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia

Name	Next Duty Assignment
GEISSINGER, Verne E., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet (for temporary duty and further assignment on board a vessel), Naval Air Station San Diego, California
GILLOCK, Robert H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.
GLOCHESKI, Virgil R., Commander U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
GOBER, George F., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
GOMMENGENGER, John A., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
GOULD, Alton D., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (Santa Ana), California
GRALLA, Arthur R., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Division TWO HUNDRED TWO
GRANT, James D. L., Captain, U. S. N.	Subordinate Command, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
HALLA, George F., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Porsmouth, Virginia
HAMBLIN, Robert L., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D. C.
HART, Charles S., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
HATHAWAY, Amos T., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Division NINETY-TWO
HAWKINS, David D., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ALGOL (AKA-54)
HEARN, Guy E., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
HEDLUND, Earl C., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Far East Air Force
HENRY, Eugene B., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
HEROLD, Frank B., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Mare Island, California
HERRICK, Eugene G., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Washington, D. C.
HESS, Glenn C., Lieutenant Colonel, (TC), U. S. A.	Armed Forces Staff College, 8497th Army Administration Unit, Norfolk, Virginia (for duty with Staff and Faculty)
HINDMAN, Stancly E., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
HOFFMAN, Oscar A., Doctor	Operations Evaluation Group, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
HOGAN, Edward E., Captain (MC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet
HOLLERBACH, Eugene J., Major (Inf), U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Far East, Yokohama, Japan
HOLTZ, Arnold H., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. UNION (AKA-106)
HORTON, John A., Captain, U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
HOWELL, William S., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
HOWLE, Robert P., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	2349th Personnel Processing Group, Camp Stoneman, California (Continental Air Command), (for further assignment to 5th Air Force)
HUFF, Alvin D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42)
HUMPHREY, Ernest W., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
HUNTER, Kelvin H., Colonel (Art), U. S. A.	U. S. Army Forces, Europe, Bremerhaven, Germany

Name	Next Duty Assignment
HYLAND, William W., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Officer-in-Charge, General Supply Depot, Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California
JACK, Richard G., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
JACKSON, Clifton E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Bureau of Aeronautics Representative, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Kansas City, Missouri
JACKSON, Erwin S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C.
JEFFREY, Richard P., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
JENNINGS, Lewis B., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
JEWETT, Garry W., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. MISPILLION (AO-105)
JOGL, Joseph W., Lieutenant Colonel, (Armor), U. S. A.	Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 8531st Army Administrative Unit, Washington, D. C.
JOHNSON, Dwight L., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
JOHNSON, Frank L., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SEMINOLE (AKA-104)
JOHNSON, Melvin O., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Alaska
JOHNSTON, William J., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	General Stores Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
JONES, Lafayette J., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. HENRICO (APA-45)
JOSHUA, Edward R., Jr., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California
KAUFFMAN, Draper L., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO
KEEDY, C. L., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Forces, Germany

Name	Next Duty Assignment
KEITHLY, Roger M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
KELLY, Marion C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Subordinate Command, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
KEMBLE, John H., Professor	Pomona College, Claremont, California
KERR, Evor S., Jr., Commander, U. S. C. G.	Commanding Officer, WINNEBAGO (WPG-40)
KINERT, David F., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
KINSELLA, William T., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
KLINE, Roy L., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina
KRAUSE, Harris F., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
KUEHL, Howard F., Captain (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
*LAKE, Richard C., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Base, New York, Brooklyn, New York
LANE, Stanley H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
LANSDOWNE, Falklan M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
LA ROCQUE, Gene R., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. MILLER (DD-535)
LARSEN, Harold H., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

*The President and officers of the Naval War College are deeply grieved to learn of Captain Lake's untimely death, two weeks following graduation.

Name	Next Duty Assignment
LAWSON, Dunbar, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Professor of Naval Science, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Unit, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
LAYTON, Robert F., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, 506th Air Base Group (506th Strategic Fighter Wing), Strategic Air Command, Dow Air Force Base, Maine
LEEK, Frederick E., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina
LEEMAN, Robert W., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
LEFAVOUR, William R., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NIOBRARA (AO-72)
LEMLY, Frederick H., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CUTLASS (SS-478)
LEWIS, Lawrence E., II, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Combat Information Center Officers School, duty under instruction, Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois
LIKES, David H., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Flight "A", 7470th Headquarters Support Squadron, APO 55, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.
LITTLE, James W., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
LUOSEY, Michael J., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
LYMAN, Charles H., III, Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MABLEY, Louis C., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CALOOSAHATCHEE (AO-98)
MACINTOSH, Donald E., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
MANN, Glenn E. W., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
MARINKE, Charles A., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MARSHALL, Edmund S. L., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MARTIN, Neal, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Fleet Logistic Air Wing, Atlantic/Continental, Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland
MASTERSON, Kleber S., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LENAWEE (APA-195)
McCAUGHEY, William H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. MANTA (AGSS-299)
McFETRIDGE, George W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet (prospective commanding officer of a fighter squadron) Naval Air Station San Diego, California
McGOVERN, William M., Professor	Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
McIVER, John F., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Officer-in-Charge, Naval Purchasing Office, New York City, New York
McLEAN, Bernard W., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
McMILLAN, Hoyt, Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
McNEAL, Horace P., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California
MEEKER, Roland J., Lieutenant Colonel, (Art), U. S. A.	Staff, Naval War College
MEEKER, Roy L., Major, U. S. A. F.	28th Air Division, Hamilton Air Force Base, California
MERRYMAN, Charles A., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Professor of Naval Science, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Unit, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
MILLER, Austin A., Colonel (QMC), U. S. A.	Quartermaster School, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Name	Next Duty Assignment
MILLER, Frank B., Captain, U S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. PALAU (CVE-122)
MILLER, Robert N., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MILLER, Shirley S., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
MILLS, James H., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MOORE, Howard S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
MOORE, Luther S., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (Santa Ana), California
MOORER, Thomas H., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia
MORSE, John H., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
MURRAY, Harry L., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, (Inf), U. S. A.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
MYERS, R. A., Major, U. S. A. F.	1002d Inspector General Group, Norton Air Force Base, California
MYERS, Richard L., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Squadron THREE
NAUMAN, Harley K., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NEREUS (AS-17)
NEEL, John W., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	U. S. S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)
NICHOLS, Franklin A., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters 21st Fighter Bomber Wing (for contemplated duty as Commanding Officer, 21st Maintenance and Supply Group)
NORMILE, Walter G., Lieutenant Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander Service Squadron THREE
NORRIS, William H., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
ODEND'HAL, Charles J., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Naval Forces Far East
OGDEN, James R., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
O'GRADY, James W., Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
OLSEN, Eliot, Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. YOSEMITE (AD-19)
PACE, John E., Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C.
PARKER, Raymond F., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
PATTON, David B., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, Pensacola, Florida
PAUL, John H., Captain (DC), U. S. N.	Naval Station, Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia
PEDERSON, Oscar, Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
PENLAND, Joe R., Commander, U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
PERKINS, William B., Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Submarine Squadron TEN
PHELAN, George R., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining at Naval War College (Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power)
PLATE, Douglas C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
PLUMLEE, Carl H., Commander (CEC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
PORTER, Ross A., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
POST, William S., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CAVALIER (APA-37)
RAHT, Adolphus G., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. GHERARDI (DMS-30)

Name	Next Duty Assignment
RANDALL, Margaret H., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
RANDALL, Samuel M., Captain, U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
RAU, Robert E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Bureau of Aeronautics, General Representative, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
REED, David W., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Far East Air Force
REEVES, Malcolm C., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commandant, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C.
REISER, Lloyd M., Lieutenant Colonel, (SigC), U. S. A.	9577th Technical Service Unit, White Sands Signal Corps Agency, Las Crucas, New Mexico
REMBERT, John P., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
RICE, Harold E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Underwater Ordnance Station, Newport, R. I.
RICHEY, Julius E., Commander, U. S. C. G.	Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
RILEY, George B., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
RIORDAN, James T., Commander (CEC), U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
RIORDAN, Stephen J., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
ROBERTS, Deane C., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ROBERTSON, Edward L., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Chief, U. S. Naval Mission to Colombia, Bogota, Colombia
ROBINSON, Samuel J., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. RUNNER (SS-476)
ROCHEFORT, Joseph J., Captain, (Retired) U. S. N.	Relieved of Active Duty

Name	Next Duty Assignment
RODEHEFFER, Noah J., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Troop Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia
ROESSLER, Anthony C., Captain, U.S.N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LAERTES (AR-20)
ROLL, George A., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	3rd Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ROSS, Orville B., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Remaining on Staff Naval War College
RUTTER, James B., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Amphibious Control Division TWENTY-TWO
RUTTER, Royal L.,Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NOBLE (APA-218)
RYAN, John W., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Military Sea Transportation Service, Atlantic Area, Brooklyn, New York
SAMPSON, Courtney H., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BURDO (APD-133)
SANDS, Eugene T., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Joint Task Force 7, Washington, D. C.
SAPP, Clyde C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BOWERS (APD-40)
SCHMIDT, Feodor O., Colonel (Inf), U. S. A.	Retirement
SCHULL, Edson, Colonel (Armor), U. S. A.	2128th-3 Army Service Unit, Fort Knox, Kentucky
SCHURTER, Orie O., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, (Strategic Air Command), Carswell Air Force Base, Texas
SCHWEER, William W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. MERRICK (AKA-97)
SESSUMS, Walter M., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
SHAW-CORTHORN, George, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Professor of Naval Science, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Unit, University of California, Berkeley, California
SHEA, Maurice W., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Submarine Division FORTY-TWO
SHEPPARD, Charles P., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
SHIVE, Donald W., Colonel, U. S. A.	Assignment to the U. S. Army, Caribbean, Fort Amador, Canal Zone
SHUTTLEWORTH, Walter G., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Bureau of Aeronautics Representative, Factory "A," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, California
SMITH, James G., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Staff, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for further assignment
SMITH, James W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
SMITH, Joseph A., Jr., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.	Released from Active Duty
SMITH, Peter S., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Training Command, Pacific Fleet
SNEAD, William O., Jr., Captain, U.S.N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SANBORN (APA-193)
SOUTH, Thomas W., II, Captain, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
SPARKS, Ben, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.
SPAWN, Douglas W., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	313th Troop Carrier Wing, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
STALEY, David L., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington, D. C.
STALEY, Poyntell C., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	The Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.

Name	Next Duty Assignment
STANDISH, Eben M., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
STECHER, Robert W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. RASHER (SSR-269) (when placed in commission)
STEEVES, Doris E., Lieutenant, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
STEPHENS, Jerrel D., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
STEPHENS, Sidney B., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SEA CAT (SS-399)
STEVENS, Paul F., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commanding Officer, Composite Squadron EIGHT
STOWE, Jack L., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida
STRANG, Arthur L., Mr.	Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C.
STRAUB, Charles T., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
STROHL, Mitchell P., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
STRONG, Robert W., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, (with Directorate of Intelligence)
STUART, Robert M., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C.
SYMONS, Floyd M., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
TABER, Edward A., Jr., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron FORTY-NINE
TATE, Jule C., Captain (CEC), U. S. N.	Deputy Director, Pacific Division, Bureau of Yards and Docks
TAUL, James, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (for assignment to duty in the Far East)
TAYLOR, Keith E., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
THEOBALD, Robert A., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
THOMPSON, Allyn R., Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
THOMPSON, Richard E., Colonel, U. S. M. C.	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia
TIEDEMAN, Carl, Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Destroyer Flotilla SIX
TOWNSEND, Harry E., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Fleet Training Group, Narragansett Bay
TRAYLOR, James T., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BURRFISH (SSR-312)
TUCKER, Robert W., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
TURNER, Charles H., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, SIXTH Fleet
TYLER, Willoughby B., Lieutenant Colonel (Inf), U. S. A.	Army Field Forces Board No. 1, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
UEHLING, Gordon A., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
VAN ARSDALL, Clyde J., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
VAUGHAN, James J., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Fleet Air, Quonset, Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, R. I.
VERBEEK, Harry P., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, Control Division, Military Air Transportation Service, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
VETH, Kenneth L., Commander, U. S. N.	Commander, Mine Division TWO
VIRDEN, Frank, Captain, U. S. N.	Commander, Transport Division FIFTEEN
VOLONTE, Joseph E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. S. KENNETH D. BAILEY (DDR-713), (when placed in commission)
VOLZ, Edward M., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, San Diego, California
WAGLINE, John H., Commander, U. S. C. G.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College

Name	Next Duty Assignment
WAGNER, Seiss E., Colonel (Inf), U. S. A.	7689th Headquarters Group, U. S. Forces, Austria, Salzburg, Austria
WALDMAN, Albert C., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
WALKER, Lewis W., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
WALSH, James G., Commander (SC), U. S. N.	Boston Naval Shipyard, Boston, Massachusetts
WATKINS, Nelson P., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Naval War College
WEBB, Thomas S., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia
WELCH, David F., Commander, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
WENDT, Willard A., Major, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
WENTZ, Paul N., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. F.	2349th Personnel Processing Group, Camp Stoneman, California (Continental Air Command) (for further assignment to 5th Air Force)
WESCHLER, Thomas R., Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CLARENCE K. BRONSON, (DD-668)
WESTRUP, Warren E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Air Station, Anacostia, Washington, D. C.
WHEATLEY, Thomas R., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Unit, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
WHITE, Mary L., Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
WHITNEY, Alden W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. COATES (DE-685)

Name	Next Duty Assignment
WILHELM, Don L., Jr., Colonel, U. S. A. F.	Headquarters, Strategic Fighter Wing (42d Air Division), Strategic Air Command, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
WILLIAMS, Jack L., Lieutenant Colonel, (QMC), U. S. A.	Staff, Naval War College
WILLIAMSON, Thomas E., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Amphibious Group ONE
WILLIS, Richard W., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida
WILSON, Albert H., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
WINN, Norman M., Colonel, U. S. A.	Remaining on Staff, Naval War College
WITTING, Maurice E., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet
WITZEL, Frederick D., Captain (SC), U. S. N.	Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
WRIGHT, James M., Captain, U. S. N.	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.
WULFF, John T., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Pacific Reserve Fleet, San Francisco, California
WYLIE, Joseph C., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ARNEB (AKA-56)
YAVORSKY, Joseph T., Commander, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Fleet Air Wings, Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia
YOUNG, Edwin J. S., Captain, U. S. N.	Staff, Commander, Carrier Division ONE
YOUNG, William C., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C.
ZUMWALT, Elmo R., Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.	Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *The End of a Revolution.* 191 p.

Author: Sternberg, Fritz. N. Y., The John Day Co., 1953.

Evaluation: The basic assertion of this short work is that Russia, instead of being the most advanced of socialist states, has become in reality the most reactionary state in the world today. The book covers a brief comparison of the French and Russian Revolutions, an analysis of Russia's present industrial strength and a description of the labor exploitation techniques and the social content of the dictatorship. It describes the effects of the exploitation of the Russian people on the foreign policy of the Soviets with respect to the satellites, Yugoslavia, the free European states, and Asia. It lays out the steps which the Free World must take to meet this force. An epilogue contains a description of the latest five-year plan. This volume is an excellent brief presentation of the situation. It sets forth the basic factual data in logical array and develops sound conclusions. The final recommendations may not be in agreement with the thinking of the majority of Americans, yet they are a valuable contribution.

Title: *The Return of Germany.* 310 p.

Author: Muhlen, Norbert. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1953.

Evaluation: The Return of Germany shows life in Germany in the light of Allied and Russian occupation. It presents Germany as a formidable ally of the Western world and Chancellor Adenauer as an intelligent, powerful influence in the re-

building of Germany and in his efforts to lead Germany to regain her appropriate place in the world community. This book is interesting and is recommended as background reading on studies concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Title: *Why Democracy?* 249 p.

Author: Ross, Alf. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952.

Evaluation: This volume is dedicated to the ever-needed task of analyzing democracy. Beginning with a survey of the growth of democratic ideas the author, a Professor of Public Law at the University of Copenhagen, systematically examines the theories of democracy, the ideas and social conditions of democracy, and the technique of democracy. A special effort is made to put the case of the Social Democratic parties of Europe in a favorable light. The book is particularly useful for American readers who wish to learn more of the West European attitude toward both socialism and democracy.

Title: *Foreign Policies of the United States.* 614 p.

Author: Barber, Hollis W. N. Y., Dryden Press, 1953.

Evaluation: Though basically a college text, this book should prove of interest and value to the general reader. It uses both an historical and an area approach. A general introduction is followed by an account of our relations with Europe, with the countries of the Western Hemisphere and with the Far East. There is a long section on the U. S. A. and the United Nations at the end. The author strives to be factual and objective, but it is clear that he is a vigerous internationalist in his political views.

Title: *Strategy for Survival.* 306 p.

Author: Kieffer, John E. N. Y., David McKay Co., 1953.

Evaluation: Mr. John Kieffer has assumed that total war between democracies and the communists is inevitable. He insists that democracies have only one chance for survival—complete annihilation of the communists in total war. He makes no allowance for any measures short of complete victory for the democracies and conclusive destruction of the communists. The concepts presented for the different phases of the war may appear plausible to the uninitiated, but the thoughtful reader is likely to view his concept of action as unrealistic. One may be especially sceptical

of his enthusiasm for achieving peace so early in a world full of destruction. Some of his analysis and estimates of the situation are excellent.

Title: *Pan-Slavism.* 335 p.

Author: Kohn, Hans. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

Evaluation: A scholarly study of nationalist trends among the Slav nations from the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars to the present, by a frequent lecturer at the Naval War College and the outstanding authority of today on the subject of "nationalism." The book is highly documented to show clearly the significance and influence of Pan-Slavism as reflected by Slavic thinking and ideology during three periods of history: 1815-1860, 1860-1905, 1905-1950. The book is perhaps more detailed than might be desired by War College students, but as the only authoritative source on the subject, it has significant meaning today in a world situation where the success of the Russians in dealing with their Slavic Satellites is of vital concern to strategists of the Free World.

Title: *The World and the West.* 99 p.

Author: Toynbee, Arnold J. N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1953.

Evaluation: Consisting of a collection of radio talks given by the noted historian, this work is concerned with the political effects of cultural contacts between Western Europe and other portions of the world. One chapter (the weakest) deals with the effects of Western European culture upon Russia. Other chapters deal (more adequately) with the Near East, India, and the Far East. Toynbee shows that many recent political developments are the result of the acceptance of Europe's technical knowledge and social attitudes and the rejection of Europe's spiritual background.

Title: *History of the German General Staff,* 1657-1945. 499 p.

Author: Goerlitz, Walter, N. Y., Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953.

Evaluation: The history of the German General Staff is traced from its earliest recognizable roots in Frederick the Great's time, through its actual formulation in the time of Napoleon to its destruction under Hitler in 1944-45. It is pri-

marily a story of the great, near-great and, too often, of the unknown personalities who formed and directed it. The first two hundred pages tell its story through World War I and, although told against the background of Prussian (German) and European social and economic history, it assumes a familiarity with history which the averago American reader is unlikely to have. The second half of the book is devoted to World War II and its immediate prelude. Despite its preoccupation with many little-known and unnecessary details, the book contains many valuable lessons for the military student.

Title: *Can Russia Survive?* 128 p.

Author: Czarnomski, F. B. N. Y., Philosophical Library, 1953.

Evaluation: This short book makes use of known facts and the writings of others to prove the author's thesis that the Soviet State is incapablo of solving any of the problems necessary to enable it to consolidate and stabilize itself as a system of government. The author offers evidence to prove that lack of progress, living conditions, godlessness, social inequalities and nature of the people all tend to point up that the Soviet State is doomed to failure. The writer also, in summary, gives his views on how the civilized world can haston the rapid disintegration of the Soviet organization.

Title: *Economic Planning for the Peace.* 384 p.

Author: Penrose, E. F. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1953.

Evaluation: A study of the planning done during World War II and immediately afterward for the post-war economic organization of Europe. The author outlines the tragic errors, as well as the major successes, in American and British foreign policy. He indicates the extent to which the planning for post-war peace was influenced by the personalities of Rooscvelt, Churchill, Morgenthau and Keynes. This book was written by the economic advisor to the U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant. It reflects the opinions of one who has intimate knowledge of the background and reasons for the political and economic decisions that were made. It is an excellent case study of the pitfalls to be avoided by political and military leaders who may be faced, in the future, with the task of organizing the world community for peace.

PERIODICALS

Title: *The Defense of Europe.*

Author: Gruenther, Alfred M., General, U. S. A.

Publication: ORDNANCE, May-June, 1953, p. 922-924.

Annotation: The present status of NATO is reported on by General Gruenther, recently named to succeed General Ridgway as Supreme Commander of SHAPE.

Title: *Defense and Strategy.*

Publication: FORTUNE, June, 1953, p. 89-90, 94-98.

Annotation: Comments on the new administration's approach to military management, the reversal of the 1954 target date for strategic planning purposes and the efficient operation of the Military Sea Transportation Service.

Title: *On Maritime Strategy.*

Author: Wylie, J. C., Jr., Captain, U. S. N.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May, 1953, p. 467-477.

Annotation: A member of the Naval War College Staff examines four aspects of the subject: the theory of maritime strategy; past experience in its use; the effect of modern weapons and techniques of warfare upon modern strategies; and present use of military power with respect to maritime strategy.

Title: *The NATO Defense College.*

Author: WINGFIELD, M. R. G., Captain, Royal Navy.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May, 1953, p. 491-493.

Annotation: Describes the college whose mission is to educate the officers of the NATO nations in the spirit and aims of NATO and to study the economic, strategical and political problems involved in NATO defense.

Title: *Brain Warfare—Russia's Secret Weapon.*

Author: Dulles, Allen W.

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 8, 1953, p. 54, 56, 58.

Annotation: Excerpts from an address by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency on April 10, 1953, explains the techniques employed by the Soviets in gaining control of men's minds.

Title: *Europe After Stalin.*

Author. Herald, George W.

Publication: UNITED NATIONS WORLD, May, 1953, p. 12-16.

Annotation: Analyzes Malenkov's policy in Europe, revealing that it is based upon two defensive reasons: to protect the satellites from liberation, and to defend Russia itself against aggression—pointing out certain facts that Malenkov must be convinced of if our policies are to succeed.

Title: *Powerful Gray Diplomats.*

Publication: NAVAL AVIATION NEWS (RESTRICTED), May 1953, p. 1-5.

Annotation: Describes the activities of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, where it is continuously visiting scores of ports and is always prepared to fulfill its role as a coordinated and powerful striking force.

Title: *Training for Statesmanship.*

Publication: THE ATLANTIC, May, 1953, p. 40-43.

Annotation: The former Ambassador to Russia, in making some recommendations for the education of diplomats and students of international affairs, gives first place to basic instruction in the humanities, supplemented with the course in international affairs.

Title: *Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East.*

Author: Hoskins, Halford L.

Publication: AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, March, 1953, p. 188-198.

Annotation: Discusses relations between the West and the Middle East since the forming of NATO in 1949, pointing out that the area will remain a security problem until the Western nations learn and act on the precept that mutual security rests upon "the mutuality of the ends sought and the means proposed."

Title: *Sea Power—Keystone of Air Power.*

Author: Gallery, D. V., Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Publication: READER'S DIGEST, May, 1953, p. 29-35.

Annotation: Declares that a strong navy is necessary to protect our merchant shipping, which supplies raw materials needed by the national defense effort to carry the war to the enemy's shore and to supply our overseas bases.